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My thesis brings Gothic and animal studies into conversation to 
examine the violence of eating rituals in human culture towards the animals 
and animality. Eating is conceptualised in three registers—literal, symbolic, 
and discursive—and explored through the lens of the contemporary Gothic in 
popular culture, where a particular trending motif of the rehumanised zombie 
stretches the biological and ontological logic of the monster species 
mythology by returning the zombie to its original human state. Jonathan 
Levine‟s film adaptation of Warm Bodies (2013) and Dominic Mitchell‟s 
zombie TV drama In the Flesh (2013- ) demonstrate how these three eating 
modes are enacted through the narrative of Gothic rehumanisation. The 
implication of this tripartite metonymic eating is that they are all predicated on 
the speciesist logic of compulsorily sacrificing the nonhuman other—zombie 
and animal. The figure of the rehumanised zombie in Warm Bodies and In the 
Flesh thus not only performs but also naturalises the concomitant exclusionary 
violence of sacrificing the nonhuman other within inclusionary tactics of 
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1.  The Metonymy of Eating and the Sacrificial Animal 
Eating is carnal and spiritual, nourishing for both the body and soul. It 
begins with the simple relationship between the eating subject and the object 
being eaten. Eating is therefore also relational because it sets up the binary 
relationship between the two of them. The overall picture is, however, far 
more complex when this pair is webbed into a more sophisticated network of 
eating relations. A balance between the subject and object is ideally observed, 
until, of course, desire comes along to disrupt the equilibrium. When eating is 
overly skewed in favour of one party and at the expense of the other, it 
becomes a form of violence and power play. One therefore “eat[s] badly,” as 
Derrida would say, if the subject eats to nourish only the “self,” without 
“learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat” (“Eating Well” 
115; emphasis in the original). Over time, as this one-sided situation becomes 
systematically reinforced and institutionalised, the violence of this parasitic 
relationship is not only repressed but also naturalised, and therefore 
legitimised. Such is the relationship between the human eater and the 
nonhuman animal being eaten.       
In Animal Rites, Cary Wolfe questions this humanist exploitation of 
the nonhuman animal, as well as the inadequacy of existing philosophical 
debates in addressing this issue. He states that posthumanist theories, which 
are supposed to  
dispute the logocentric, anthropocentric subject in fact end up 
reinstating its very determination precisely because their 
investigation does not transcend the human species itself, or, 
even when it attempts to overcome the dogmatic barrier 
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between the human and the nonhuman, it still tackles the 
question of the animal with an exclusionary approach. (qtd. in 
Pireddu 111) 
Indeed, posthumanist theories, rather than challenging the status quo, slips 
back into a humanist framework without actually redressing the imbalance in 
the human-animal divide. The animal is thus yet to be properly accounted for 
by posthumanist discourses.    
To move the debate forward, Wolfe focuses on the materialisation of 
the discourses of animality in human culture. It would, however, be a gross 
misconception of Wolfe‟s work to think that it is only about the animals and 
the related ethics. Rather than slipping into the reductionist trap of 
oversimplifying the posthumanist debate to a mere championing of animal 
rights, Mitchell explains, in reference to the title Animal Rites, that Wolfe 
himself “strategically circumvents the current impasse over animal rights by 
focusing on the rituals we construct around the figures of animals and the 
„animate‟—our narratives of brutality and cannibalism, monstrosity and 
normativity, our metaphors of animation and the anima or soul” (xiv; 
emphasis in the original). In this regard, Wolfe situates the discourse of 
animality within the larger cultural landscape, taking a deconstructionist 
approach to unpack the ideological abuse of the nonhuman animal in aesthetic 
works.   
In fact, Wolfe‟s emphasis on the performative provides an invaluable 
bridge between Derrida‟s “Eating Well” and his own Animal Rites. Combining 
Derrida‟s specific eating motif and Wolfe‟s emphasis on the performative 
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rituals, one is able to examine the “eating rites”1 involved in constructing 
humanity and animality (hence the title of my thesis). With the eating motif, 
one can examine the relational dynamics between the human and nonhuman 
animal, which, as discussed above, is characterised by the violence of 
systematic exploitation. With the performative ritual, one can understand how 
this particular dynamics is repeated endlessly throughout history and in 
different forms. Eating as a performative ritual is thus responsible for 
naturalising the recurring violence and repression constitutive of the 
relationship between the human and the nonhuman animal throughout the 
history of mankind.  
In the “Limits of Digestion” interview, Birnbaum and Olsson cited a 
quote by German philosopher Novalis that had inspired Derrida in his 
contemplation of the eating motif in speculative thought:  
All enjoyment, all taking in and assimilation, is eating, or 
rather: eating is nothing other than assimilation. All spiritual 
pleasure can be expressed through eating. In friendship, one 
really eats of the friend, or feeds on him. It is a genuine trope to 
substitute the body for the spirit—and, at a commemorative 
dinner for a friend, to enjoy, with bold, supersensual 
imagination, his flesh in every bite, and his blood in every gulp. 
This certainly seems barbaric to the taste of our time—but who 
forces us to think of precisely the raw, rotting flesh and blood? 
The physical assimilation is mysterious enough to be a 
beautiful image of the spiritual meaning—and are blood and 
                                                          
1
 The pun of “eating rights” will be considered in my final chapter. 
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flesh really so loathsome and ignoble? In truth, there is more 
here than gold and diamonds, and the time is soon at hand 
when we will have a higher conception of the organic body.  
Who knows how sublime a symbol blood is? It is precisely 
that which is disgusting in the organic components that points 
to something very lofty in them. We recoil from them, as if 
from ghosts, and sense with childish terror a mysterious world 
in this mix, perhaps an old acquaintance. But to return to the 
commemorative dinner—can‟t it be imagined that our friend 
has turned into a being whose body has now become bread, and 
whose blood has become wine? [emphasis in the original] 
(Novalis 102-3) 
As a ritual, eating is implicated in the dichotomisation of the sacred and 
profane; what can be eaten, what must be repressed and therefore sacrificed 
for the sake of civility. The “raw, rotting flesh and blood” in the above excerpt 
is a graphic reminder of the violence of literal eating that runs counter to civil 
taste. Sublimated eating, which imbues eating with an elevated symbolic 
significance, is much easier on the stomach. More importantly, what is even 
more repressed, as evident in the excerpt itself, is the fact that in nearly every 
“commemorative dinner” held by humans, the most taken-for-granted source 
of this “flesh and blood” actually comes from the nonhuman animals, where 
the violence of their undoing is concealed and repressed before they end up as 
carcasses and delicacies on the dining table. The literal sacrifice of the 
nonhuman animal thus enables the spiritual transcendence of the human. 
Somewhere, a compulsory space is created for the barbaric and impure, a 
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cesspool of the “disgusting” that must be kept away from the rest of the 
“organic components” that constitute human civilisation. Such is the 
rationalisation of a purist conception of an anthropocentric reality, where 
nonhuman animals and animality must be cast by and for the humans into this 
compulsory space, the sacrificial altars, to be burnt, made meaning of, and 
then conveniently repressed.  
On one hand, eating is conventionally understood on the material level 
as a cultural ritual of feeding oneself with something “external and foreign” 
(Derrida, “Limits of Digestion” 2) for physical sustenance and pleasure. On 
the other, it can also be deployed as a vocabulary for articulating other forms 
of subject-object relationality beyond this literal register: “In friendship, one 
really eats of the friend, or feeds on him” (Novalis 102). This opens up the 
notion of eating to other registers of relationality, such as how different 
symbolic subjects relate to one another and how different forms of knowledge 
interact within a discursive space. There are thus three modes of eating—
literal, symbolic, and discursive—to be considered in the conception of the 
human-nonhuman relationship. Derrida calls this tripartite eating the 
“metonymy of introjection” (“Eating Well” 115), that is, the eating ritual and 
how it replicates its relational structure of eating in the various registers of the 
language. Each mode feeds off the other in support of the institution of 
consumption, which in turn, feeds off the compulsorily sacrificed nonhuman 
animal so as to produce the food, logic, and knowledge required to nourish the 
monolith of humanity. 
One of the cultural fields in which this tripartite eating flourishes is the 
Gothic in popular culture. As Angela Carter comments, “we live in Gothic 
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times” (122) where marginalised genres start to “prevail over canonised 
counterparts” (qtd. in Botting 285), leading to an increased presence, almost 
over-saturation, of monster figures such as the vampires and zombies within 
the popular culture landscape. Indeed, Mitchell observes the “obsession of 
popular culture in our time with figures of animality, animation, artificial life 
forms, cloning, and biotechnology; and above all, the fundamental issue of 
biopower, biotechnology, and human rights in a time when so many human 
beings are treated as animals or worse” (xiv). The Gothic in popular culture is 
but one of the symptoms of this obsession with the ritualistic eating of the 
animal and animality.  
This thesis begins with a systematic study of each of the three registers 
of eating, the overlapping relations between them and how they all follow the 
same trajectory of positing the nonhuman animal as the ultimate sacrifice. This 
sets the foundation for the next chapter, where this tripartite eating is worked 
through the Gothic texts Warm Bodies and In the Flesh. Common to these 
texts is a particular trending motif in the Gothic genre of the rehumanised 
zombie that stretches the biological and ontological of the monster species 
mythology by returning the zombie to its original human state. As mentioned, 
the implication of the tripartite metonymic eating is that they are all predicated 
on the speciesist logic of compulsorily sacrificing the nonhuman other—
zombie and animal. The figure of the rehumanised zombie in Warm Bodies 
and In the Flesh thus not only performs but also naturalises the concomitant 
exclusionary violence of sacrificing the nonhuman other within inclusionary 




1.1.  Literal eating: carnivorism, cannibalism, and Gothic vegetarianism 
Eating is one of the most naturalised performative acts in human 
culture connecting the human species to nature. In particular, the eating of 
meat, or carnivorism, has come to define the relationship between humans and 
nonhuman animals. Historically, the “natural” dynamics is such that the 
human subject is almost always the hunter and the eater, while the animal the 
hunted and objectified food to be eaten. Except for a few religiously fetishised 
ones, thousands of years of human civilisation have born witness to this 
glacial but systematic establishment of a rather one-sided relationship. The 
fissure of this human-animal relationship grew irreparably wider with the 
dawn of the Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century. Principle 
identifies this period as the “turning point in the modern relationship between 
humans and nonhumans, when the institutionalised speciesism characteristic 
of society today began to take hold” (“Introduction” 1). Indeed, he states that  
In industrialising society, a paradigm shift in the agricultural 
means of production—from tillage to animal pasturage and 
mechanised slaughter—led to the commodification of animals 
and the institutionalisation of meat, radically altering the 
relationship between the species. Such a transformation led to a 
dramatic increase in the availability and consumption of meat 
and, consequently, to anthropocentric society‟s attempts to 
rationalise the realities of animal slaughter and deny species 
likeness by enforcing, “clear boundaries between the states of 
the dead and living. (“(M)eating” 25) 
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The material institutionalisation of animals as mass produced and mass 
consumed meat, backed by the legitimising strategies of Enlightenment 
rationality, ineluctably installs meat-eating as an ideological “mark of cultural 
superiority” (Miller 72) for the human species. As a system, Petsche argues, 
carnivorism “depends upon the speciesist recognition of the intellectual and 
emotional superiority of humans” (104)—a process of cherry-picking 
“human” criteria problematised in animal rights discourses—and an ideology 
that secures and naturalises the relationship between the human eater and the 
animal being eaten. In Theory of Religion, Bataille explains that the nonhuman 
animal is nothing more than a “corpse” and a “thing” (39). Nonhuman animals 
are reduced to that of a “thing [as] a basic human given” (Bataille 39) and 
sacrificed for the utilitarian purpose of serving mankind, either as resources or 
as domestic pets. Within this carnivorist logic, the nonhuman animal is no 
longer seen as an animal, but a naturalised, fetishised commodity of the 
modern consumerist culture (Petsche 106). Indeed, as Stephanie Rowe 
proclaims, “if humanity has forsaken its concern for nonhuman animals, it is 
due to „the rhetoric of a carnivorous culture, not nature‟” (qtd. in Petsche 104). 
Derrida makes a distinction between animal and human in eating. In 
“Limits of Digestion,” he posits that “animals have a negative relation to the 
object because they simply swallow it. Human negativity, however, is 
reflected: man does not in fact devour the object, but rather incorporates it 
abstractly, and thereby creates the inner space that is the subject” (2). 
Carnivorous eating is thus essential to the symbolic formation of human 
subjectivity, while negating animal subjectivity. In fact, “being a carnivore,” 
Calarco argues, “is at the very heart of becoming a full subject in society” 
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(qtd. in Pestche 105). In other words, the nonhuman animal not only offers 
flesh as food in the literal sense, but also gives flesh to the subjectivity of a 
carnivorous human. In “Force of Law,” Derrida asserts that 
In our culture, carnivorous sacrifice is fundamental, dominant, 
regulated by the highest industrial technology, as is biological 
experimentation on animals—so vital to our modernity [. . .] 
Carnivorous sacrifice is essential to the structure of subjectivity 
[because it forms] the basis of our culture and our law, and all 
the cannibalism, symbolic or not, that structure intersubjectivity 
in nursing, love, mourning, and, in truth, in all symbolic or 
linguistic appropriations. [emphasis in the original] (247) 
Much is at stake in securing the species order—of human as eater and animal 
as the eaten—through the sacrificial logic and structure of carnivorism, the 
latter being one of the pillars in the formation of human subjectivity. Anxieties 
abound when this species order is threatened by another form of eating, that of 
cannibalism, where the human is posited in the same position as the animal as 
meat. If, as Petsche claims, “when the animal becomes meat it is no longer 
merely about the assertion of human superiority but the erasure of animal 
subjectivity or animality itself” (106), then by the same reasoning, when 
human becomes meat, it is not just about the relinquishment of the authority of 
anthropocentrism, but more gravely, the erasure of human subjectivity or 
humanity itself—a vision deemed apocalyptic by all measures.  
Cannibalism is thus perceived as savage, animalistic, and monstrous 
within the context of human civilisation. Such literal eating of the human as 
meat by fellow humans is necessarily constructed as a monstrous taboo in 
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civilised societies in order to preserve the ontological sanctity of the human. 
Unsurprisingly, species boundaries, tenuously secured by carnivorism and 
easily threatened by cannibalism, are ideal fodder for Gothic consumption. In 
his introduction to a series of critical essays intersecting Gothic studies and 
ecocriticism, Principle argues that  
Nineteenth- and twenty-first century Gothic aesthetics are 
closely knit; both are the product of periods of seismic, 
industrial, mechanical, or technological growth that radically 
destabilised conceptions of non/human identity. Indeed present-
day environmental and ethical concerns for human and 
nonhuman life can be traced to emerging, eschatological fears 
over the extinction of the human race in the industrialising 
nineteenth century, when the commodification of the animals 
caused a paradigmatic breach in our relationship with nature. 
The Gothic often portrays this estrangement in panicked, 
dystopian terms, as humans‟ reluctance to come to terms with 
their nonhuman ancestry and the common, biological original 
of all life. Indeed the Gothic is wont to remind us that we are 
shaped not only by where we come from, but by what we eat, 
and how we interact with the environment and all forms of life.  
(“Introduction” 2) 
Indeed, we are what we eat. Following the logic of this aphorism, if “what we 
eat is monstrous [such as human or dead corpses],” Principle argues, then 
“consumption is [not only] coded as a formula for monstrosity” (“(M)eating” 
26) but also a sobering reminder that “we are all meat” (Principle, 
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“Introduction” 5) and, conversely, meat-eating monsters. The Gothic genre, as 
suggested, mobilises the meat-eating ideologies of carnivorism and 
cannibalism in constructing monstrosity, “unleash[ing] a categorical crisis that 
threatens to fracture the allegedly irreducible biological and ontological 
binaries that constitute an anthropocentric conception of reality. The act of 
meat-eating implies a breach of both human-nonhuman and life-death 
distinctions, suggesting a monstrous state of cross-species corporeality and 
ontological liminality” (Principle, “Introducion” 3). It is thus necessary to 
deploy naturalising ideologies to suppress the destabilising threat of this 
monstrous meat-eating discourse. Ideology works best when its operations are 
well camouflaged; so for a discourse that has been buried for so long, it would 
hardly be any surprise if the recent surge in ecocritical discourses unravels 
countless examples within the Gothic tradition where the construction of 
monstrosity is articulated explicitly through one of the most naturalised 
practices in human culture, that of meat-eating. 
A few classic Gothic monsters, such as Dracula and Frankenstein‟s 
creature, have already been mobilised to problematise the monstrous construct 
in relation to the species divide upheld by meat diets. In “(M)eating Dracula: 
Food and Death in Stoker‟s Novel,” Principle makes an insightful point on the 
uncanny resemblance between carnivorism and cannibalism as embodied by 
the characters Harker and Dracula; both are “bound by the same necrophagous 
impulse, that is they both „eat death‟; one a carnivore who eats passively 
slaughtered nonhumans and the other a cannibal who eats humans he kills (or 
renders undead) himself” (31). But unlike the Dracula‟s tabooed cannibalism, 
Harker‟s “form of corpse consumption, carnivorism [. . .] is sanctioned by 
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modern flesh-eating society” (32), as long as the acts of animal slaughter are 
kept out of sight. That both necrophagous eaters are more similar than what 
the text‟s binary structure suggests is glossed over by the monstrous construct 
used to maintain species difference and order. Monstrous consumption, 
Principle concludes, thus “perilously underscores the (in)distinction between 
carnivorism and cannibalism, exploding conventional notions of species 
identity by threatening a reversion to the Darwinian sameness that nineteenth 
century anthropocentric authority sought so vigorously to suppress” (32). 
While meat-eating signals an entry into the carnivorist and speciesist 
order, refusing to eat animal meat by choice, and hence revealing it to be a 
naturalised habit, is a clear resistance and threat to the dominance of the 
anthropocentric social order that depends on the “ostensibly natural diet of 
carnivorism” (Petsche 107). In Shelley‟s Frankenstein, the creature establishes 
his moral goodness through vegetarianism when pleading with Frankenstein to 
make him a female companion: “My food is not that of man; I do not destroy 
the lamb and the kid to glut my appetite; acorns and berries afford me 
sufficient nourishment” (120). In foregrounding his vegetarian diet, the 
creature tries to mitigate his monstrosity. More importantly, Petsche argues 
that Frankenstein‟s creature, “as a commodity of industrial animal food 
production that was not consumed but resurrected only to reject the human 
practice of meat-eating, endangers the speciesist and carnivorist social order” 
(99). Gothic vegetarianism thus deflects monstrosity on to the carnivorous 
humans whose culture and dominance—not sustenance, as “acorns and 
berries” would suffice—depend on the seemingly gratuitous and excessive 
exploitation of nonhuman animals. 
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The trope of Gothic vegetarianism finds its way into the vampire genre 
with the rise of the sympathetic vampire with a moral conscience.  In the TV 
drama True Blood, some of these vampires sublimate their desire for human 
blood by turning to an inferior but socially and morally acceptable 
alternative—the synthetic blood called Tru Blood. Teenage vampires Edward 
Cullen and Stefan Salvatore of the respective Twilight and The Vampire 
Diaries series resort to hunting animals in the forest for bare sustenance, 
practising a kind of self-imposed Gothic vegetarianism that not only 
downplays their monstrous otherness but also complements their image as teen 
icons of fantasy romance. In “Dying to Eat: The Vegetarian Ethics of 
Twilight,” Kazez parallels Stephenie Meyer‟s concept of Gothic vegetarianism 
with conventional vegetarianism: “Edward satisfies his nutritional 
requirements by feasting on animal blood, which makes him, he says, a 
vegetarian—by vampire standards. Animal blood is like tofu, for the Cullen 
family, but they live on a human-free diet anyway, because it‟s the right thing 
to do” (25). Although eating is a must for survival in the Gothic world, eating 
animals is ethically preferred to eating humans, as it is the “right thing to do,” 
betraying an underlying speciesist bias where the humans are placed in an 
“exalted moral category and [. . .] that animals exist to serve human purposes” 
(Kazez 25-6). Tenga and Zimmerman suggest that Gothic vegetarianism is a 
move to restore and maintain species order, arguing that the reformed 
vampires willingly abstain from feeding on humans directly but "feed on the 
same animals that humans eat [. . .] to acknowledge human priority as being at 
the top of the food chain, to which many humans believe they are biblically 
and biologically entitled" (80). Gothic vegetarianism is therefore highly 
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problematic because, far from being a morally elevated form of eating, if not 
more hypocritical, it reveals itself to be an equally deeply anthropocentric and  
speciesist “alternative” grounded in the same sacrificial logic of “feed[ing] on 
the same animals” as that of carnivorism. 
Whether it is carnivorism, cannibalism, or Gothic vegetarianism, the 
nonhuman animal serves as the literal food and rhetorical logic for 
legitimising and delegitimising the various dietary habits. Through an 
EcoGothic lens, the rituals of eating and abstaining from meat not only expose 
the constructedness and anxieties of unstable species boundaries, but also 
reveal the ideological strategies for upholding anthropocentric hegemony at 
the expense of the nonhuman other. From the outset, the animal is positioned 
as a default “thing,” stripped of any subjectivity, because, as Bataille argues, 
“man does not eat anything before he has made an object of it”; even before 
the animal is food on the table, it was already retroactively defined “as a thing 
beforehand” by the carnivorous human (39). The parasitic logic of this human-
animal relationship is taken to a clean finish; after the animal is eaten, 
digested, and parasited of all of its nutrition, it is expelled to the periphery of 
civilisation as excrement. The healthful nourishment and purification of the 
human body and culture is thus complete, reboot, and poised for the next 
round of sacrificial rite—an endless, mechanised, and inhumane repetition in 
the modern industrialised era of mass production and consumption.  
 
1.2.  Symbolic anthropophagy: social oppression and assimilation 
In the “Eating Well” interview, Derrida discusses the question of the 
animal and the entrenchment of carnivorist ideologies in subjectivity 
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formation. He attaches the prefix “carno-” to his already “famous portmanteau 
designation of the essence of Western metaphysics” (Wolfe, Animal Rites 100) 
to introduce the new term “carnophallogocentrism” (“Eating Well” 113). 
Malatino offers a useful breakdown of this term:  
In his addition of the prefix “carno” to phallogocentrism, 
[Derrida] is iterating a linkage between masculinity and meat-
eating [. . .] Phallogocentrism is a tripartite conjunction of 
“phallus,” used to denote not an anatomical penis, but rather the 
symbolic or representative instances wherein the phallus is 
conflated with the signification of power; “logos,” the Greek 
term for “word,” “speech,” and “reason” that serves to 
highlight a particular kind of privileged gendering operative in 
the realms of language; and “centrism,” which points to the 
organisation of discourse around this conflation of reason and 
masculinity. Derrida‟s addition of “carno” to this term 
imbricates acts of meat eating and animal sacrifice as key to the 
discursive construction of subjects of Reason. Masculinity and 
carnivorism work together to support the virility, power, and 
authority of one who argues, dialogues, and speaks reasonably. 
(131)  
Whether it is eating or speaking, subjectivity and, as Roy argues, “ethical 
imperative [pass] through, indeed [begin] with, the mouth” (328). Within this 
carnophallogocentric structure, the carnivorous man of Reason and his oral 
fulfilments require the sacrifice of the nonhuman animal. Wolfe calls this 
systematic exploitation of the nonhuman species a form of institutionalised 
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speciesism, arguing that the latter is “not only a logical or linguistic structure 
that marginalises and objectifies the other solely based on species, but also a 
whole network of material practices that reproduce that logic as a materialised 
institution and rely on it for legitimisation. [In doing so, it] takes for granted 
the fundamental sacrifice of nonhuman animals (in what we eat, what we 
wear, the testing of the products we buy, etc.)” (101; emphasis in the original). 
Speciesism is thus a monolithic institution that has a profound material basis 
in human culture for the ideological production of speciesist logic in various 
social contexts.  
The consequences of institutionalised speciesism, however, extend 
beyond the animals. As Wolfe argues, besides the animals directly involved, 
humans who are treated with this logic of the animal are implicated as well:  
The humanist concept of subjectivity is inseparable from the 
discourse and institution of speciesism, which relies upon the 
tacit acceptance [. . .] that the full transcendence of the 
“human” requires the sacrifice of the “animal” and the 
animalistic, which in turn makes possible a symbolic economy 
in which we can engage in a “noncriminal putting to death” (as 
Derrida puts it) not only of animals, but other humans as well, 
by marking them as animals. [emphasis in the original] (43) 
The question of social marking is also a question of legality. To begin with, 
Derrida argues in “Force of Law” that the animal is not considered a “subject 
of the law and of right” (246). In marking the human as an animal, 
dehumanisation tactics play right into this “place left open” of the law that 
allows for a “noncriminal putting to death” (“Eating Well” 112). This 
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dangerous speciesist logic implies that killing animals is technically not 
illegal, so then killing animalised humans can be rationalised as being not 
illegal; in fact, it may even be rationalised as a just move in certain contexts. 
Whether it is literal or symbolic eating, these operations of “ingestion, 
incorporation, or introjection of the corpse,” Derrida argues, are “as real as it 
is symbolic when the corpse is „animal‟ [. . .], a symbolic operation when the 
corpse is „human‟” (112). Both forms of eating are thus symbiotic. In 
continuing to legitimise and sustain the institution of speciesism at the 
material base level, Wolfe claims, “the ideological work of marking human 
others as animals for the purposes of their objectification and sacrifice” (101) 
can then be executed effectively.  
The human-animal relationship thus has a profound impact on human-
human intersubjectivity. In the latter, symbolic eating between the human self 
and human other takes on the distinct tone of anthropophagy. Derrida claims 
that all cultures practise this symbolic form of human-eating: “The so called 
nonanthropophagic cultures practise symbolic anthropophagy and even 
construct their most elevated socius, indeed the sublimity of their morality, 
their politics, and their right, on this anthropophagy” (114). While literal 
cannibalism is typically marked as a savage practice, it is highly ironic that 
civilised societies should unwittingly embrace symbolic anthropophagy as a 
basic mode of exchange between human subjects, slotting these subjects into 
their respective social strata. Eating in its symbolic register, Pireddu posits, is 
thus “a metonymy for the carnophallogocentric introjections of the other by an 
authoritative and autonomous human subject” (118). In other words, the 
dominant party carnophallogentrically introjects the other “abstractly” in order 
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to create an “inner space that is the subject” (Derrida, “Limits of Digestion” 
2). The hegemonic schema of carnophallogocentrism, an institution enabled 
by the uneven human-animal relations, thus becomes a structuring principle 
for the way the human self relates to the human other, where the dominant 
human eats the dominated one to construct its own and the other‟s 
subjectivity.   
The most straightforward example of symbolic anthropophagy is social 
oppression. In Sexual Politics of Meat, Carol Adams examines the problem of 
the double gesture of carnophallogentrism in oppressing women and animals 
simultaneously. Through the lens of ecological feminism, she provides a 
detailed analysis of how the institution of speciesism “transcodes the edible 
bodies of animals and the sexualised bodies of women” (qtd. in Wolfe 104), 
arguing that   
in speciesist, sexist society, both women and animals are 
subject to a twofold process of objectification that foregrounds 
edible or sexually charged body parts and makes what [she] 
calls an „absent referent‟ of the subjectivity and ontogeny of the 
other [. . . ] Thus, for example, dead cows are „meat,‟ baby ones 
„veal,‟ dead and dismembered pigs „pork,‟ and so on. The 
sexist absenting of women operates by the same sort of 
renaming of women as animals (chick, beaver, Playboy bunny) 
and figurative dismemberment (piece of ass, leg man or breast 
man). (qtd. in Wolfe 105)  
The carnophallogocentric structure of transcoding species and gender thus 
allows man to acquire power and authority as a subject of what Derrida calls 
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“carnivorous virility” (“Eating Well” 113). Through this transcoding strategy, 
women and animals can be legitimately “eaten” by the “carnivorous masculine 
man” within an overarching “logic of domination‟‟ (qtd. in Wolfe 105), that is, 
the logic of carnophallogentrism.     
This oppressive logic also extends to the discourse of race. Wolfe 
argues that historically, the discourse of animality has been deployed for social 
oppression in human-human intersubjectivity, based on a “strategy whose 
legitimacy and force depend [. . .] on the prior taking for granted of the 
traditional ontological distinction, and consequent ethical divide, between 
human and nonhuman animals” (“Intro,” Zoontologies xx). In terms of racial 
relations, Étienne Balibar claims that “every theoretical racism draws upon 
anthropological universals”, underneath which lies “the persistent presence of 
the same „question‟: that of the difference between humanity and animality‟ 
that is responsible for “the systematic „bestialisation‟ of individuals and 
racialised human groups” (56-7; emphasis in the original). In other words, the 
discourse of animality is essential to the theoretical conceptualisation of the 
history of racism (Balibar 57). In fact, theoretical racism is founded on the 
“sacrificial economy of speciesism,” where the “unquestioned availability of 
„animality,‟” Wolfe posits, “[acts] as a means of naturalising and grounding 
racist discourse” (Animal Rites 167). What this also means is that for animality 
to be a “crucial supplement to the discourse of racism,” there must be a “prior 
tak[ing] for granted” of the ontological distinction and ethical divide between 
the human and nonhuman animal. Anthropocentric discourses on social 
oppression are thus, as Wolfe argues, also “inseparable from the discourse and 
institution of speciesism” (43; emphasis in the original). 
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While Wolfe posits that social oppression is predicated on the sacrifice 
of the nonhuman animal; the apparently opposite operation, that of social 
assimilation, actually enacts the same, if not more cleverly disguised, 
speciesist violence on the animal. Although assimilationism has real social 
benefits on the practical level, philosophically, it is highly problematic.  One 
way of interrogating it is by staging inclusionary regimes, such as 
homonormativity, in a different context. In his analysis of the short film Gay 
Zombie, Grilli examines the problem of coupling the discourses of species and 
sexuality, specifically that of zombieness and homosexuality, within a 
homonormative regime. He argues that 
the superimposition-equalisation of gays and zombies [. . .] 
makes it possible to explore the risks of homonormative 
repression: just as, in a heteronormative context, a gay man is 
rejected by the group, so in a place where what elsewhere 
counts as stigma is the rule, such as the gay community, a new 
stigma, such as being a zombie, brings about the exact same 
rejection. (56) 
In Gay Zombie, the gay zombie protagonist is discriminated against by the gay 
human community based on his species status; the “superimposition-
equalisation” of two or more discourses of otherness thus exposes the 
exclusionary gaps, or more precisely, the repressed, sacrificial subjects, of 
“new” dominant regimes. The homonormative regime is revealed to be 
speciesist; rather unsurprisingly, the sacrificial lamb is the nonhuman zombie. 
Wolfe points out that speciesism “relies upon the tacit acceptance [. . .] that 
the full transcendence of the „human‟ requires the sacrifice of the „animal‟ and 
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the animalistic” (43)—the operative word being “tacit.” Indeed, without 
juxtaposing humanist discourses with the species discourse, closed regimes 
such as heteronormativity and homonormativity suffer the blind spot of being 
oblivious to the repressed, unspoken sacrifice of the nonhuman species used 
for supporting them, until the right context comes along to illuminate their 
exclusionary gaps.  
Social oppression and assimilation, while conventionally thought to be 
diametrically opposed operations, are actually two sides of the same coin; both 
processes involve incorporating—in both the physical and social sense of the 
word—the social other into the dominant digestive system, and both sing the 
same speciesist tune. Dehumanisation, or animalisation, within an oppressive 
regime is premised on the discourse of speciesism, while the seemingly 
inclusionary regime of socially integrating the human other into the normative 
centre belies an anthropocentric prejudice that requires another other, that of 
the nonhuman animal, to remain outside the doors, such as in the case of 
excluding bestiality from the socially accepted range of queer sexualities. 
Animality is thus symbolically expelled from the ontological territory of 
humanity in order to achieve what Wolfe calls the “full transcendence of the 
„human‟” (43).  
 
1.3.  Discursive parasitism: ideological “asymmetry between discourses” 
 Beyond the symbolic level of intersubjective formation among real 
subjects and fictional characters, the larger discourses in general, such as 
sexuality, gender, race, and species, are also mobilised in political and literary 
contexts on the metatextual level, replicating similar relational dynamics. In 
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“Subject to Sacrifice,” Wolfe examines the problematics of having two or 
more larger discursive forces operate simultaneously within a multi-coded 
text. Butler cautions against assuming that these embedded discourses carry 
equal weight or perform equal workload, drawing special attention to the 
inherent “asymmetry between discourses” (qtd. in Wolfe 99). In Bodies That 
Matter, Butler argues that  
It seems crucial to resist the model of power that would set up 
racism and homophobia and misogyny as parallel or analogical 
relations. The assertion of their abstract or structural 
equivalence not only misses the specific histories of their 
construction and elaboration, but also delays the important 
work of thinking through the ways in which these vectors of 
power require and deploy each other for the purpose of their 
own articulation. (xxvi) 
Social discourses, when pitted against one another within the same space, 
engender a discursive hierarchy that is deeply ideological in itself. As Wolfe 
posits, it is in the “unevenness of social discourses” (99), the fissures within 
these tectonic movements, that the most ideological work is accomplished. In 
reference to his close analysis of the film The Silence of the Lambs, Wolfe 
claims that the discourses of gender and class “all remain in play, powerful in 
their own right [but] these discourses „deploy each other‟ in [a necessarily] 
uneven ideological space specific to this film” (99). In fact, Wolfe explains, 
“this [uneven] deployment is critical to the systematic rearticulation of these 
codes in terms of the most far-reaching and powerful discourse in the film: the 
discourse of species” (99). In other words, discursive asymmetry within a text 
23 
 
is a requisite condition for effective ideological production, so that in a text 
like The Silence of the Lambs, when the far more taken-for-granted species 
discourse is stealthily but powerfully mobilised to rearticulate humanist 
discourses, speciesism becomes the necessary but ideologically enabling 
product in this deployment.  
In Flesh and Warm Bodies, zombieness, articulated through the species 
discourse, serves as an allegory of human otherness in the text. While 
humanity, zombieness, and animality are allegorically coded, these discourses 
are by no means deployed evenly; in fact, the discursive unevenness is skewed 
very much in favour of humanist discourses, where humanity is constituted 
over and against nonhuman otherness. Serres captures the dynamics of such 
lop-sided relations in a social context, arguing that  
A human group is organised with one-way relations, where one 
eats the other and where the second cannot benefit at all from 
the first [. . .] The flow goes one way, never the other. I call this 
semiconduction, this valve, this single arrow, this relation 
without a reversal of direction, “parasitic” (5) 
In the context of the species discourse, the nonhuman other, set as a 
contrastive negative to the human in a binary relation, is parasited by its 
counterpart and drained of its nutrition to nourish anthropocentric discourses. 
Even though the human-nonhuman relationship comprises two components, 
there is a lack of reciprocity in this exchange. Rather than an “exchange 
value,” the organisation of this relation, as Serres posits, is based on an “abuse 
value” defined as “complete, irrevocable consummation” that flows in only 
“one direction” (80). This abusive dynamics then translates into a 
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corresponding power hierarchy, where the dominant eats the dominated. 
Serres relates the notion of the parasite to the eating motif:  
Parasite. The prefix para- means “near,” “next to,” measures a 
distance. The sitos is the food. In this open mouth that speaks 
and eats, what is next to eating, its neighbouring function, is 
what emits sound. Para measures a difference between a 
reception and, on the contrary, an expansion. The latter makes 
one‟s own what is in common and what will soon be even more 
one‟s own, the living body. It already eats space. (144) 
In “Eating Well,” Derrida claims that Western metaphysics is entwined in a 
regime of carnophallogocentrism, implicating the eating culture of mankind; 
even Serres‟ concept of the parasite demonstrates that relationality is always 
constituted by the metonymy of eating. “To parasite,” according to Serres, 
“means to eat next to,” before the relation quickly transitions into “eating at 
the expense of [and] always [eat]ing the same thing, the host” (7). Metonymic 
eating is thus not only fundamentally carnivorous, but also speciesist in that it 
requires the sacrifice of the animal and animality. In this one-sided, 
exploitative relationship, Wolfe argues that humanity plays the “primary 
parasitism” while animality the “sacrificial secondary expulsion” (“Intro,” 
Parasite xvii). Discursive parasitism, which is an epistemological form of 
eating, thus enacts what Spivak calls “epistemic violence” (76). In a speciesist 
context, the violence lies in the discursive manipulation and disavowal of a 
reductive notion of animality to construct humanist knowledge and reality. In 
other words, the sacrificial violence of the nonhuman animal is, as Wolfe 
argues, to allow for the “transcendence of the human” (Animal Rites 66), that 
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is, upholding the ontological status of the human as a transcendental being, 
with or without the slightest awareness of a deep-seated human superiority 
complex.  
 This form of discursive parasitism is particularly prominent though 
deeply repressed in the Gothic genre. As a social metaphor, the Gothic 
monster is encoded with the fears and anxieties of its time, particularly in 
relation to social otherness. The discourse of species, evoking the human-
nonhuman divide along biological and ontological lines, institutes itself as a 
privileged locus for working out the tensions of other humanist divides such as 
man-woman and white-black. This discursive deployment sets up the various 
divides as structural analogies within the Gothic text itself. In order for this 
deployment to work, the human-nonhuman divide has to be taken, in the first 
place, as a naturalised dichotomy of a deeply taken-for-granted discourse, 
which would then give the impression of a pseudo-stable construct. In offering 
the uncontested pseudo-stability of a metaphorical terrain for ironing out those 
humanist tensions, the species discourse generates the mirroring effect of 
naturalising the corresponding binaristic relations governing human-human 
intersubjectivity. Such superimposition can be characterised as an ideological 
sleight-of-hand. While humanist discourses are deconstructed and interrogated 
through the species discourse, the latter remains nothing but an allegorical 
platform, left intact and still deeply problematic. Discursive parasitism 
therefore enacts epistemic violence on the nonhuman species, replicating the 
sort of violence that comes with speciesist sacrifice in other registers—literal 








Fig. 1. Screenshot from The Walking Dead (“Coda”). The image of zombies inside a church juxtaposed 
with a biblical line from the Last Supper: “He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life.” 
 
A horde of zombies overruns a church in the zombie-infested, post-
apocalyptic world of The Walking Dead TV drama, looking for something—
human as food-“thing” in the Bataillean sense—to eat. Etched across the arch 
in this scene (refer to fig. 1) are the ominous words from the Last Supper: 
“Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will 
raise him up at the last day” (King James Version, John 6.54). This biblical 
line resonates with Gothic irony. In literalising the conventional zombie tropes 
of resurrection, cannibalism, and immortality, the juxtaposition in this image 
signals a flagrant transgression of the sacred institution of religion by profane 
Gothic elements within a dystopian universe. The church is no longer the 
“Lord‟s house” that Father Gabriel still imagines it to be; it is, as Maggie 
replies to him matter-of-factly, nothing but “four walls and a roof” (“Four 
Walls and a Roof”), a practical stopover for the human eaters (zombies) and 
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humans to be eaten (human survivors) alike, as well as a slaughterhouse for 
exterminating a rival group consisting of cannibalistic humans.  
Indeed, in juxtaposing the symbolic dimension of the eating motif in 
the Last Supper quote with the literal cannibalism of the traditional zombies, 
this image captures the unnerving synergy between the different registers of 
eating within the zombie text. The narrative involves not only different forms 
of literal eating, but also the register of symbolic anthropophagy that shapes 
the intersubjective dynamics among the characters. One example of humans 
symbolically cannibalising other humans is the massacre of the cannibals by 
other human survivors inside the church. Before this incident, the latter were 
themselves almost slaughtered—just like animals—by the former in an 
abattoir-like warehouse, where they were made to kneel before a trough, their 
throats slit and bodies left to bleed dry. The church massacre is no doubt a 
form of revenge, but it also allays the group‟s fear of being symbolically and 
literally preyed on by those cannibalistic humans again. It is worth noting that 
all this human drama happens with, ironically, the “real” cannibals, that is, the 
zombies, lurking in the backdrop.   
The Walking Dead thus far focuses on the micro-narratives of 
characters negotiating, whether it be losing or recuperating, humanity in 
numerous life-and-death situations. A recent shift in the zombie genre gives 
rise to other texts that express a far greater ambition in the transcendental 
project of restoring and securing humanity—a greater “hope” for humanity. In 
these texts, the once-human zombie is given a second chance of becoming 
human again. The zombie genre thus starts showing signs of taking on an 
assimilationist attitude towards the nonhuman monster.    
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Warm Bodies and In the Flesh are two such texts that embody this 
trend. But as discussed in the previous chapter, this Gothic trend is highly 
problematic as it reinforces the institution of speciesism through the three 
registers of eating. Eating within and of these texts thus begin with the act of 
ingestion, then digestion, and finally the excretion of the zombie-animal, all on 
the literal, symbolic, and discursive level.  
 
2.1.  Fourth wave zombie: the “sentient and sympathetic ghoul” 
 Gothic creatures in the past, as noted by Botting, were “once 
represented as malevolent, disturbed, or deviant” (286). They epitomised the 
pure monster that satisfied the position of and desire for horror and the abject 
in culture. In contemporary popular culture, however, these Gothic creatures 
have taken on a sympathetic turn to become “fascinating, attractive, and more 
humane” (Bishop 159), a generic evolution that happened in tandem with the 
changing socio-political climate of the assimilationist human rights 
movements in various societies in the last forty years or so. Although these 
creatures are being humanised, or anthropomorphised, they still retain 
trappings of their monstrosity. In particular, the ones that have undergone, still 
are undergoing, this humanising evolution of the horror genre are the vampire, 
the zombie, and the werewolf. It is not by chance that they are the ones chosen 
out of the many other monsters within the horror pool; they share the same 
mythological thread in that they were once human before turning into the pure 
monster. It is only logical that events come full circle, where the reversal and 
demythologisation of monstrosity begin with these popular half-human, half 
monstrous creatures.   
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The rise of the sympathetic vampire began in the 1970s with Rice‟s 
Interview with the Vampire (1976), then adapted into the highly sexualised, 
Neil Jordan‟s Interview with the Vampire: The Vampire Chronicles (1994). 
Bishop argues that “vampires were no longer merely devious fiends to be 
feared and hunted, but rather romantic and tragic souls with human emulated, 
most especially in the recent „teen vampire‟ craze ignited by Meyers‟ Twilight 
series of novels” (159) and the subsequent five-part film series The Twilight 
Saga (2008-12). Indeed, this “new” vampire, as Tenga and Zimmerman note, 
“obeys human laws, respects Western society‟s norms, and shares its values” 
(77), echoing the assimilationist ethos of the “new homonormativity” 
movement as defined by Duggan to be “a politics that does not contest 
dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and 
sustains them while promising the possibility of a demobilised gay 
constituency and a privatised, depoliticised gay culture anchored in 
domesticity and consumption” (50). The “new” assimilationist vampire has 
come to be a metaphor for the homonormative LGBT subject, an idea that is 
explicitly taken up in the TV drama True Blood (2008-14) in its analogous 
portrayal of the vampires‟ civil rights movement. Because the homonormative 
subject has now become a “subject of a difference that is almost the same, but 
not quite” (Bhabha 122) as the heteronormative subject, the dehumanising 
strategy of depicting the sexual other as the pure monster ineluctably falls 
short. With the rise of the sympathetic vampire, true monstrosity has 
disappeared, creating what Tenga and Zimmerman call a “horror vacuum” 
(84), one in which the vampire‟s successor is expected to fill. Its undead 
cousin, the zombie, enters the scene naturally. Tenga and Zimmerman explain 
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this cultural phenomenon by arguing that “the zombie‟s rise in popularity 
alongside the vampire‟s reform and humanisation offers compelling evidence 
of the human need for a genuinely abject monster” (84). Indeed, throughout 
history, culture has always had its fair share of pure monsters by renewing its 
horror repertoire through countless reinterpretations and innovations.      
 The zombie genre is, however, also starting to follow the lead of its 
vampire cousin in its current incarnation of the sympathetic vampire. The 
history of the zombie tradition can be briefly charted in four waves: the first 
wave zombie is rooted in “Haitian folklore and African roots” and these 
zombies are “reanimated corpses that were used primarily as slaves and who 
neither threatened the living nor ate human flesh” (Tenga and Zimmerman 
84). Romero ushered in with his Night of the Living Dead (1968) the second 
wave where he combined the Caribbean zombie figure with that of the flesh-
eating ghoul to produce the canonical zombie “marked by an indomitable 
impulse to cannibalism” (Grilli 47). The third wave plays on the idea of speed, 
transforming the lumbering zombie into the “fast zombie” (Riley 196), 
popularised by Danny Boyle‟s 28 Days Later (2002), as a metaphor for the 
rapid contagion of infectious biological diseases and e-viruses (Riley 196-9).
2
 
As a reaction to the heightened immediacy and accelerated onslaught of the 
third wave “fast zombie,” the fourth wave zombie becomes a necessary and 
natural progression of the zombie genre, a defensive desire to allay and 
domesticate this unrelenting threat. Bishop calls this fourth wave zombie the 
“sentient and sympathetic ghoul” (160). 
                                                          
2
 Grilli calls the sympathetic zombie, which I categorise as the fourth wave zombie, the “third 
kind of zombie” (47). He does not seem to recognise the “fast zombie” as constituting a new 
wave in the zombie tradition.  
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Grilli notes that the zombie genre had first taken a sympathetic turn 
with Daniel O‟Bannon‟s The Return of the Living Dead (1985) where the 
zombie has consciousness, “is able to talk and has an individual personality” 
(47). The rise of zombie comedies, or “zombedies” and the “splatstick” 
comedy in the 1990s,
3
 as Bishop observes, is a sign of the cinema beginning to 
“deflect the horror of the zombies through humour and satire” where the 
creatures are humanised, “give[n] limited sentience [and] barely articulate 
speech” (81). Within the darker horror genre itself, Romero also began 
humanising his zombies with Bub the zombie lab rat (refer to fig. 2) of a 
paternalistic Frankensteinian scientist in Day of the Dead (1985) and Big 
Daddy, a weapon-wielding zombie, (refer to fig. 3) in Land of the Dead (2005) 
who galvanises the rest of the zombies in an organised invasion of the human 
city.
4




Fig. 2. Screenshot from Day of the Dead. Bub is put through a series of test to see if he can remember 
things from his human past. Here, he is asked to recall how to use the phone.  
 
                                                          
3
 In more recent times, the more known productions are Edgar Wright‟s Shaun of the Dead 
(2004) and Ruben Fleischer‟s Zombieland (2009) 
4
 In his chapter on “Humanising the Living Dead,” Kyle Bishop analyses the use of “cinematic 
suture” (166) to encourage audience sympathy for and identification with these humanised 





Fig. 3. Screenshot from Land of the Dead. Big Daddy learns how to use the machine gun by a stroke of 
luck and fires it at an escaping vehicle. 
 
nascent development of the zombie figure as a “fully realised zombie 
protagonist” (159).  
Critics have considered the potential of the zombie in being 
humanised, just like its vampire counterpart. Grilli argues for the relatability 
of the zombie figure, stating that although the zombie is a “mirror of the 
emptied out and alienated humanity,” its characteristic “fierce, immediate and 
unconditional impulses” contrasts paradoxically with the “zombified” humans 
of the modern condition, thus making the zombie seem less “a source of horror 
[than] an object of more or less strong empathy” (51). The natural transition 
then for the evolution of the zombie genre is to humanise the zombie, to grant 
it, as Grilli argues, “consciousness and personality” (51). He goes on to argue 
for the redemptive potential of the zombie figure that once represented 
complete lack: 
I believe that the zombie‟s shift from an unambiguously 
fearsome and horrible creature to an alien not totally devoid of 
sympathetic traits is driven by the acknowledgement of its 
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potential to represent not the essence of pure negativity, like so 
many horror-movie monsters, from the protagonist of 
Halloween (Usa, John Carpenter, 1978) to the little girl in The 
Ring (Usa-Japan, Gore Verbinski, 2002, remake of Ringu, 
Japan, Hideo Nakata, 1998) but a wounded, but still somehow 
potentially positive vision of humanity. This also explains why  
zombies, werewolves and vampires, unlike more radical aliens, 
can bend to sympathetic and comic treatments. [emphasis in the 
original] (53) 
These nonhuman monsters, which were previously human, thus also represent 
hope for humanity, rather than just the traditional conception of them as “pure 
negativity.” They can be returned literally to their human state, be 
rehumanised, rather than just a literary gesture of being humanised. The 
humans who have become like the monsters can then reclaim their humanity 
vicariously through the rehumanised monsters, whose monstrosity is literally, 
though questionably, exorcised from the figure. 
 One contemporary example of the rehumanised zombie taking centre 
stage is Jonathan Levine‟s Warm Bodies (2013), adapted from Isaac Marion‟s 
novel of the same title (2010). In literary terms, this means that the zombie 
finally gets to play the protagonist, rather than serving as a mere narrative tool. 
In the rom-com Warm Bodies, R, the zombie protagonist, falls in love with the 
human protagonist Julie and literally becomes a human eventually. This idea 
of the zombie-human romance is hinted at earlier in Andrew Currie‟s Fido 
(2007), where the female owner, having fallen out of love with her husband, 
takes a liking to her zombie domestic helper Fido (“faith”). The difference 
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between Fido and R is that Fido does not turn into a human in the end. Warm 
Bodies takes the zombie-human romance further, drawing on the obvious 
analogy of the classic Shakespearean couple Romeo and Juliet. This film 
signals the zombie figure‟s Hollywood debut into the romance genre, as if to 
declare, albeit in a tongue-in-cheek manner, that it has caught up with its 
vampire cousin in having its own brand of zombie romance. But the fact 
remains that for any human romance to work, just as in Disney‟s adaptation 
(1991) of the traditional French fairy tale Beauty and the Beast and many 
other Gothic narratives, the nonhuman monster has to become a human, or at 
least take a human form. In this regard, the zombie has to turn into a human or 
look like a human, with little or no visible signs of bodily wear and tear or 
decay, while the vampire largely retains its already impeccable human visage. 
The rehumanisation mythology within the romance genre in popular culture is 
thus an old technique being recycled by “new” monster figures. 
 Besides literal rehumanisation, Bishop predicts that another way 
forward for the zombie genre is through serialisation, as the “exploration into 
the human can only be fully explored over the course of a long-term narrative 
form” (206; emphasis in the original).5 Robert Kirkman, Tony Moore, and 
Charlie Adlard‟s comic series The Walking Dead (AMC, 2003-), then turned 
into the TV drama of the same name (2010-present) by Frank Darabont, is the 
best example of the serialised zombie narrative.
6
 But as Bishop has noted, The 
Walking Dead series is less about the zombies and more about the humans 
                                                          
5
 This has happened with the vampire genre since Josh Whedon‟s Buffy the Vampire Slayer 
(1997-2003), and in more recent times, Alan Ball‟s True Blood (2008-14), Kevin Williamson 
and Julie Plec‟s The Vampire Diaries (2009-present), and Julie Plec‟s The Originals (2013-
present) 
6
 Other serialised zombie narratives include Charlie Brooker‟s BAFTA-nominated 5-episode 
series Dead Set (2008) and Karl Schaefer and Craig Engler‟s Z Nation (2014) 
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(206). The zombies are largely ornamental in the series‟ meditation on 
humanity. Bishop argues that “the next step in the evolution of this highly 
specially [sic] subgenre will likely literalise the metaphor, presenting 
narratives in which the zombies tell their own stories, acting as true 
protagonists and even heroes” (196). Indeed, roughly three years after making 
this prediction, Dominic Mitchell‟s TV drama In the Flesh (BBC Three, 2013-
) combines the rehumanised zombie figure and the serialised narrative form to 
explore the journey of the protagonist Kieren Walker, a medically treated 
zombie known as the Partially Deceased Syndrome sufferer. 
 
2.2.  Are zombie and human different species? Liminality and the pharmakon 
 Broadly speaking, members of a particular species share an arbitrary 
set of characteristics. The notion of “species” has historically been examined 
along biological and ontological lines by scientists and philosophers. One 
leading voice is animal rights advocate and ethics philosopher Peter Singer. In 
Animal Liberation, Singer questions the whole selective process in biological 
discourses of isolating arbitrary “criterion” (such as pain) for (dis)qualifying 
animals for ethical consideration, arguing elsewhere in his “Prologue” to In 
Defense of Animals that “whatever the test we propose as a means of 
separating human from nonhuman animals, it is plain that if all nonhuman 
animals are going to fail it, some humans will fail as well” (qtd. in Wolfe 34). 
Going by this logic, any humanist attempt to distinguish the human from the 
nonhuman other along species lines, based on insisting the exclusivity of 
certain features to humanity, is bound to fail and reflect back on the 
inadequacy of the human category to accommodate all humans.  
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The notion and distinction of broad species categories such as the 
human and animal, as with any other definitional attempts, will always be 
problematised by exceptions that prove the constructed rule. But this does not 
stop the desire for and efforts in species categorisation; borders continue to be 
rigorously policed in various disciplines to negotiate certain conceptions of 
reality and power relations. While species categorisation proves to be highly 
problematic, it remains ideologically productive for subject-formation. 
In his analysis of The Silence of the Lambs, Wolfe maps the 
relationship between humanity and animality on to a “species grid,” 
identifying four species types: firstly, there are the “animalised animals,” the 
nonhuman animals that are the taken-for-granted objects of mankind‟s 
systematic exploitation and “carnivorous sacrifice”; secondly, there are those 
“humanised animals,” or domesticated “pets,” that are “exempted from the 
sacrificial regime by endowing them with human features”; thirdly, there are 
“animalised humans,” humans who are dehumanised and brutally mistreated 
based on the logic of the animal; and lastly, there is the idealistic notion of  the 
“humanised human” (100-1).  
Both Flesh and Warm Bodies contain three identifiable, analogous 
types that can be superimposed on to Wolfe‟s species continuum: firstly, the 
privileged human (the humanised human); secondly, the Partially Deceased 
Syndrome sufferer in Flesh and Corpses in Warm Bodies (both the humanised 
animal and the animalised human; the undecidable); and lastly, the rabid rotter 
in Flesh and Boney in Warm Bodies (the animalised animal) (refer to figs. 4-
5). The influence of the “human” and “animal” signifiers in this act of naming 





Fig. 4. Screenshots from In the Flesh (Season 1, Episodes 1-3). The aesthetics of the visage and its 
transmogrification: Amy Dyer in her three looks as the rotter (top), the PDS sufferer (middle), and the 






Fig. 5. Screenshots from Warm Bodies. The aesthetics of the three distinct states of being: the fleshless 




in “humanness” and conversely increase in “animality.” In this inversely 
proportionate play of the two signifiers, dehumanisation and animalisation are 
essentially two sides of the same coin. This species spectrum translates into a 
corresponding power hierarchy with the dominant “human” at the apex. But as 
with any taxonomical system reflexively defensive of the imaginary borders of 
its nomenclature, the structure quickly loses the permeability of its boundaries. 
The species terms and subjects are then socially hierarchised according to the 
delineations set up by the “human” and “animal” signifiers. 
The Flesh series introduces the PDS term as a convenient yet 
memorable shorthand to foreground the in-betweenness and undecidability of 
the species boundary. It describes the condition of zombies that have been 
medically treated to curb their cannibalistic desires for human brains. It also 
functions as a politically correct label to destigmatise the PDS status and to 
facilitate the nation‟s integration programme, the “PDS Domiciled Care 
Initiative” (Season 1, Episode 1), aimed at reassimilating the PDS sufferers 
into the human society. Grilli highlights the irony in the use of politically 
correct terms. He sees such strategy as a patronising form of “inclusive 
repression” that aims to “neutralise all potential centrifugal deviance by 
apparent acceptance,” arguing that 
repressive inclusion can be recognised in the conformity of the 
gay community discourse to a politically correct form of 
expression and, of course, in political correctness as such; even 
though this passes for recognition of diversity, its ultimate aim 
is in my opinion the wish to erase diversity from discourse. The 
refusal to call things by their name [. . .] is the first step of a 
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blunting of perception which ends in the impossibility to 
recognise the peculiarity and irreducibility of the individual as 
such. Far from accepting the other, political correctness makes 
it impossible to perceive its otherness, and ultimately its very 
existence. (58) 
If anything, the use of the word “Partially” shows a self-reflexive 
acknowledgement of the liminality of the PDS sufferer; a concept that is 
already native to the traditional zombie figure itself. This is, however, quickly 
problematised by the word that follows—“Deceased.” Here, the “human” 
signifier comes into play again. Despite the undecidable liminality of the PDS 
sufferer as being between life and death, only the “deceased” aspect is chosen 
to be reflected in the label. This rhetorical strategy prescribes the province of 
life exclusively to the living human, while interpellating the partially dead, 
rather than living, PDS sufferers as subjects lacking in life, and hence 
humanity. 
Kieren, as well as many other PDS characters like him, is essentially a 
rehumanised
7
 zombie. It is necessary to append the prefix “re-“ to 
“humanised” because these PDS characters are not just humanised in the 
literary sense of anthropomorphism, but are literally, though gradually over 
the course of the narrative, converted back to their original “human” state. It 
involves a biological transformation of the species from nonhuman to human; 
a reversal of the human-turned-monster mythology in popular culture. In terms 
of the aesthetics of the show, the organic wholesomeness of the human visage 
is “restored” for the rehumanised PDS sufferer as part of humanity‟s 
                                                          
7
 In an interview with the creator of Flesh, Dominic Mitchell uses the exact word 
“rehumanise” to describe the phenomenon of the PDS sufferer becoming human again.  
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delusional civilising mission to remove or hide any trace of animality, 
particularly in the privileged site of the human face. The full transformation, 
however, happens only at the close of the second season with the character 
Amy, while the front part presents the PDS sufferer as an ambiguously 
separate species with some human attributes that is on its way to becoming a 
full human again. Although rehumanisation is literalised on the level of 
species, the “human” aspect of the rehumanised PDS sufferer in its liminal 
state is far from the ideological reality of its label.  
Unlike the rehumanised Kieren, the male zombie protagonist of Warm 
Bodies R faces the doomed fate of regressing into an irreversible state of 
degradation, that of becoming a Boney. In a desperate attempt to cling to his 
literally and figuratively declining humanity, R resorts to hoarding human 
paraphernalia in his empty airplane (refer to fig. 6). His favourite possession is 
the gramophone, where he explains to Julie that vinyl has “better sound” than 




Fig. 6. Screenshot from Warm Bodies. R hoards in his empty airplane human items that remind of him of 
the humanity that is slipping away from him.  
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most humanised Corpse who shows a desire to hold on to his humanity 
through the aesthetics. Language also plays an integral part in this struggle. 
Initially, R laments his lack of communicativeness with other Corpses, as 
compared to the pre-apocalyptic days of human-to-human communication: “It 
must have been so much better before, when everyone could express 
themselves and communicate their feelings and just enjoy each other‟s 
company.” This statement is, however, infused with a satirical tone when 
juxtaposed with the flashback of a scene at the airport where nearly all the 
humans are preoccupied with their technological devices. The Corpse is a 
metaphor for the disconnected human; disconnected from humanity itself 
because of the lack of connection through verbal communication. Therefore, R 
is uncharacteristically loquacious for a zombie during the opening voiceover 
narration where he speaks with linguistic competence. This is, however, 
contrasted with his “grunting” self and the occasional “almost-conversations” 
he has with his best Corpse friend M in the diegetic world. Rather than a 
reflection of the Corpse‟s linguistic inability, this impediment is more of a 
speech degeneration, which corresponds to its eroding humanity. Later, 
however, after meeting Julie, and motivated by love, R regains some linguistic 
capability and hence his “humanity,” where he is able to stutter snatches of 
words and phrases. Aesthetic forms, including language, thus become an 
indicator of possessing and re-possessing humanity.    
  As part of the rehumanisation mythology in Flesh, the PDS sufferer is 
injected in the back of its neck with Neurotriptyline. This chemical 
“artificially stimulates the neurogenesis of gial cells [. . .] needed for proper 
brain function,” allowing for the reconnection of the “cognitive circuitry,” 
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much like a “computer rebooting” (Season 1, Episode 1). During the course of 
this medication, the PDS sufferer loses its cannibalistic desire, or desire for 
food altogether, but regains human traits like language, memories, and 
emotions, further narrowing the gap between a human and a zombie. The 
medication is literally a shot of humanity, and also, in the case of social 
reintegration, a shot at humanity again. In other words, it is a second chance 
for the PDS sufferers. Only those who manage to achieve the desired effects of 
the medication of regaining some degree of humanity, or, on a symbolic level, 
of partially repossessing the “human” signifier, are allowed back into the 
human society. Another drug, Blue Oblivion, does the opposite. Snorted 
through the nose like recreational drug, it returns the PDS sufferer to a 
temporary state of rabidity, back to its rotter self.
8
 Neurotriptyline sedates, and 
in Wolfe‟s terms, makes a “humanised human” of the PDS sufferer, while 
Blue Oblivion catalyses conflicts and turns the PDS sufferer into an 
“animalised animal” (101). They are the metaphorical switches of humanity 
and animality scaling between the extreme poles of the human and the rabid 
rotter on the species continuum.  
In other words, these drugs bring out the human and the animalistic 
monster in the PDS sufferer. The body of the PDS sufferer thus becomes a site 
for the interplay between these two elements through the effects of the drugs. 
It is the Platonic “pharmakon” that finds its reified form in the figure of the 
PDS sufferer. Derrida describes the pharmakon as follows:  
If the pharmakon is “ambivalent,” it is because it constitutes 
the medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement and 
                                                          
8
 The PDS occult group Undead Liberation Army disseminates this drug and its more radical 
members have used it in terrorist attacks in season two. 
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the play that links them among themselves, reverses them or 
makes one side cross over into the other [. . .] The pharmakon 
is the movement, the locus, and the play: (the production of) 
difference. It is the differance of difference. (“Plato‟s 
Pharmacy” 127)  
The body of the PDS sufferer, the pharmakon, is thus the ideological space, 
the “locus” for the “movement” and “play” of binary relations (life/death, 
human/zombie). Several PDS characters bear scars and stitches on their bodies 
and faces, but it is Kieren who epitomises this ambivalence in a particular 
scene. Fig. 7 is a visual representation of the liminal state of Kieren as a PDS 
sufferer, focusing on the eyes. Other parts of his face look “human”; his 
“FleshTone” mousse is intact but one of his “IrisAlways” (Season 1, Episode 
1) contacts has been removed. The audience‟s gaze, as well as Rick‟s in the 
scene, is returned with an immediate and uncanny confrontation of Kieren‟s 




Fig. 7. Screenshot from In the Flesh (Season 1, Episode 2). Kieren takes off his left contact lens (right in 
the image) to remind Rick, who is about to shoot down two rabid rotters, that the latter are like him, in 
hopes of appealing to Rick‟s empathy and love for him. 
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cosmetic help, this scene powerfully captures the dual species identity that all 
PDS sufferers straddle.  
In Warm Bodies, the figure of the Corpse is also in a similar liminal 
position as the PDS sufferer. But unlike the PDS sufferer that rises from its 
grave, the Corpses become as such when the living humans are struck by an 
unknown cause that “could have been chemical warfare or an airborne virus, 
or a radioactive outbreak monkey.” Initially, the only path for the Corpse is to 
regress to become the purely animalistic Boney. The latter is also called a  
“skeleton” because during the Corpse‟s literal nonhuman regression—the 
opposite process of rehumanisation—its human flesh gradually falls off until 
only the skeleton is left (refer to fig. 8). The biological degradation of the flesh 
thus symbolises the insidious erosion of the Corpses‟s remaining humanity. As 
with Flesh, Warm Bodies encodes and fetishes the largest organ—the human 
flesh, as in skin—enveloping nearly the entire human body as a potent marker 




Fig. 8. Screenshot from Warm Bodies. A Corpse peels off a piece of flesh from his face to reveal the 
skeletal interior, marking his slow but certain degradation of becoming a Boney.  
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species barrier is rooted. 
Kieren‟s species otherness is not external to the human, for the same 
human body hosts this zombie foreignness. This is similar to the vampire 
figure, as Botting argues, as being “a figure of transgression disturbing 
boundaries between inside and outside, home and foreignness” (288). The 
familiar narrative of the zombie invasion of cities and homes once gave the 
impression of a “distant” relationship between the human self and the zombie 
other; with the PDS sufferer, both subjectivities are conflated within an 
embodied entity, for the zombie otherness has now penetrated and taken over 
the most intimate space of the human body to co-exist with the human self. 
Grilli argues that zombies are essentially “non-foreign aliens” and the 
“objectivation of a potentiality which can be assumed to be present in every 
human” (53). Although the traditional zombie figure reminds us of the 
paradoxes of binary relations, as many zombie critics have already noted, the 
figure of the PDS sufferer presents us with another paradox; that otherness is 
as foreign as it is native, a spatial localisation of the zombie other within the 
human self, both circulating within the pharmakon of the PDS sufferer‟s body. 
This concept even extends to the geographical space, for the First Rising sees 
zombies rising from within their own lands, such as Roarton‟s very own 
village cemetery. Both the PDS sufferer‟s body and origin connote unnerving 
proximity—the monstrous other is in us, beneath our skin, and among us, 
where “us” is easily “them.” Indeed, French productions like Robin 
Campillo‟s They Came Back (2004) and the later television adaptation The 
Returned (2012) have explored the anxieties arising from the dead returning to 
their loved ones; partially familiar, for they retain past memories and the same 
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fully intact physical appearance as they had when they were alive; yet partially 
foreign, for their origins and agenda are shrouded in mystery. “[You were] 
born, bred, and died here” (Season 2, Episode 1), comments the PDS 
community care officer in disagreement with Kieren‟s decision to leave 
Roarton: the PDS sufferers are not foreign aliens, they are or were close 
friends and families who have returned—so close, they could even be a 
potential version of us, and vice versa.  
 
2.3.  Transcoding otherness: zombie-terrorist-animal as non-“subject of the 
law or of right” 
Unlike other Gothic texts where the zombie figure serves either as a 
social metaphor or a mere accessory in human-centric narratives, zombie 
otherness takes centre stage in Flesh. It can then be expected that the zombie 
allegory would be loaded with various metaphorical codes of otherness, and 
that the text would arrange its meanings according to this Gothic structure to 
lend a voice—if it does—to the relevant social others. In particular, two such 
codes, that of terrorism and animality, can be discerned.  
The second season of Flesh begins with the foreboding news of terrorist 
elements within the PDS community and the news footage of an abandoned 
“Undead Liberation Army safe house” (Season 2, Episode 1) discovered to be 
used as a makeshift factory for producing Blue Oblivion.  Four extremist 
members of the Undead Liberation Army are planning another terrorist attack, 
after “an aborted attack on the Eastford shopping centre” (Season 2, Episode 
1); this time, on one of the city trams in Lancashire. They succeed in the “PDS 
terrorist attack” (Season 2, Episode 1); during which there was a dramatic 
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opening by one of the members, echoing a verse from the Revelation—“We 
are the first and the last! We are those that liveth and were dead! And behold, 
we are alive for evermore and have the keys to hell and death in our hands!” 
(Season 2, Episode 1)—followed by a self-inducement of rabidity through the 
use of Blue Oblivion. 
The resistance of the PDS community against the living‟s oppressive 
regime manifests on several levels in the second season. Of particular 
prominence is the presence of religious extremism among some of the PDS 
sufferers associated with the Undead Liberation Army, which is, itself, being 
misrepresented as an essentially terrorist organisation. The threat of the PDS 
extremists resonates strongly in Maxine Martin‟s speech: “They may pretend 
to be like us, but what lies beneath that mask of make-up and medication is a 
cold, hard killer that cannot be reasoned with. The PDS sufferer in your home, 
in your shop, in your pub, is one missed dose away from tearing your head 
apart” (Season 2, Episode 1). Indeed, Flesh is filled with the xenophobic 
overtones of the reformed PDS sufferer lapsing into its old cannibalistic and 
hence destructive ways—just “one missed dose away” from terrorising the 
human society again. Zombieness is clearly deeply encoded with the 
discourses of terrorism and xenophobia; what ensues, of course, is a blanket 
disciplinary measure against all PDS sufferers who are deemed potential 
zombie-terrorists. 
In a campaign video for the nation-wide “PDS Give Back Scheme” 
(Season 2, Episode 2), these discourses are foregrounded again as the PDS 
sufferers are treated like reformed terrorists whose citizenship has been 
revoked. Only upon completion of this scheme are they given the chance to be 
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“re-citizenised” (Season 2, Episode 2). Criminality, repentance, indebtedness, 
and guilt-inducing are emphasised in the language of the video, what with 
expressions like “helping the communities they once destroyed,” “rebuild[ing] 
British business they once tore apart” and “giving something back to the 
society they once ravaged” (Season 2, Episode 2). The campaign video 
contains patronising interviews of human victims that belie its immensely 
passive-aggressive and accusatory tone as it repeatedly alludes to the 
destructions caused by the terrorist-like PDS sufferers when they first rose and 
were in their untreated state. One problem with this retroactive move is that 
the untreated PDS sufferers, or rotters, had no self will, unlike the calculated 
agency of the extremist PDS sufferers in their planned terrorist attacks. It is 
“unjust,” as Derrida argues, “to judge someone [in this case, the animalistic 
rabid rotter] who does not understand the language in which the law is 
inscribed or the judgement pronounced, etc.” (“Force of Law” 246). Yet even 
when the PDS sufferers acquire the ability to speak in the same human 
language, they are still not fully accepted into the anthropocentric legal system 
because of their species liminality.
9
  The law is essentially speciesist. All PDS 
sufferers are then made to pay back, wearing a humiliating vest with the words 
“I‟m PDS and I‟m Giving Back” (Season 2, Episode 2) emblazoned on the 
back, for something that they did in their natural, untreated state, much like an 
animal being punished by law for instinctively killing a human. Precisely, 
much like an animal—for it is then that the PDS sufferer, the stateless 
“terrorist” who is not under the aegis of any nation, and who was not 
considered a subject in the eyes of the human law, but is now capriciously 
                                                          
9
 This will be elaborated on slightly later in Simon‟s recount of the Ravenshead massacre. 
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subjected to and reinscribed within it in order to deliver punishment, and be 
treated with speciesist logic as a non-subject of the law, just like an animal.  
Flesh is therefore also heavily invested in transcoding zombieness with 
the discourse of animality which lays the rhetorical groundwork for 
legitimising discrimination among human groups against human others. The 




Fig. 9. Screenshot from In the Flesh (Season 2, Episode 5). Rabid rotters (on the left) are held by animal 





Fig. 10. Screenshot from In the Flesh (Season 2, Episode 3). Rabid rotters are caged up while the PDS 





Fig. 11. Screenshot from In the Flesh (Season 2, Episode 5). Doctors continue to perform vivisection on 
Simon despite his desperate plea for them to stop. 
 
The motif of discipline is evident in the use of animal restraints (refer to fig. 9) 
and the man-size cage (refer to fig. 10) in the heavily militarised medical 
institution Norfolk. PDS animality is being portrayed as a pathology that needs 
to be contained and corrected. In fact, recent Gothic TV productions, such as 
Toby Whithouse‟s Being Human (2008-13), have seen an increased trend in  
portraying monstrous cannibalism as a pathological behaviour, associating it 
with a form of addiction that can be questionably controlled with the help of 
AA groups (refer to fig. 12). In their fierce pursuit of a “cure” for the PDS 
condition, the scientists of the pharmaceutical company Halperin and Weston 
perform aggressive vivisection on the body of Simon (refer to fig. 11). Being 
the first zombie to react to the PDS medication, Simon is valued by the 
doctors as a positive test subject, just like any other animal in animal testing. 
The scene dramatises the plight of the non-speaking animals used as guinea 
pigs in vivisection for the benefit of mankind by having the monstrous 





Fig. 12. Screenshots from Being Human (top; Season 2, Episode 4) and In the Flesh (bottom; Season 1, 
Episode 1). Cannibalism (drinking blood and eating human brains) is portrayed as a pathological desire, 
in the same league as alcoholism, that requires the rehabilitative help of support groups in both texts.  
 
this anymore. Please?” (Season 2, Episode 5). Simon is a voice for the hapless, 
silenced animals that are subjected to such speciesist treatment.  
In another disciplinary institution, at the fundamentalist parish of 
Roarton, Vicar Oddie frames his condemnation of the PDS sufferers within the 
discourse of animality: “If you drug a wolf, it does not stop being a wolf. Aye, 
it‟s docile for a while, and when the drugs wear off, it will tear you limb from 
limb! That is the nature of the beast! To maim! To kill! To devour!” (Season 
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2, Episode 1). In Vicar Oddie‟s eyes, the rabid rotter and the PDS sufferer are 
the same; the latter is not taken to have, borrowing Spivak‟s phrasing, 
“graduated into [partial] humanhood” (229), but remains a potential fully-
fledged, animalistic zombie. Vicar Oddie continues his fire-and-brimstone 
rhetoric of describing them as “demons in disguise” and “agents of Satan” 
(Season 2, Episode 1), combining the discourses of religion and animality in 
demonising the PDS sufferers. As seen, animality, represented by the rabid 
rotters, is being strictly regulated by the disciplinary apparatuses of science 
and religion. Unless domesticated by medication or exorcised entirely, as 
would be the intention of the fundamentalist parish, radical speciesism is 
necessary, where PDS animality—or the possibility of reversion—cannot be 
allowed to go unchecked or remain a threat to humanity in the civilised 
societies of Flesh.  
 The image of the rabid rotter as an animalistic, human-killing monster 
is, however, complicated in a scene where the rabid rotters display “human” 
traits (refer to fig. 13). Granted, protective and survival instincts are not 
exclusive to the human species. What then makes this image—and less the 
qualities displayed—so “human” and powerfully ambivalent is the uncanny 
effect of witnessing from afar a human-looking adult zombie escorting a 
human-looking child zombie to safety after being discovered by the human 
hunters. Even Kieren is struck by the familiar and familial performance of  
“humanness” in this scene. In terms of the human apparel and figure 
behaviour, the audience is immediately reminded of the semblance of a father-
daughter relation between the two zombies. The mimetic gesture of this 





Fig. 13. Screenshots from In the Flesh (Season 1, Episode 2). Rabid rotters make for the run after being 
discovered feasting on a sheep in the woods by the HVF hunters. They sit helpless on the ground with 
guns pointing at them. 
 
zombies in their “mimetic replication of the human beings they once were” 
(85), problematising the speciesist basis for the human and zombie-animal 
divide.  
The animal is altogether excluded from the law of human culture. In 
transcoding the zombie as the terrorist and ultimately, as the animal, Flesh 
establishes symbolic equivalence among these three subjectivities, rendering 
them non-subjects of the law. In “Force of Law,” Derrida argues that   
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An animal can be made to suffer, but one would never say, in a 
sense said to be proper, that it is a wronged subject, the victim 
of a crime, of a murder, of a rape or a theft, of a perjury [. . .] 
There have been, there are still, many “subjects” among 
humankind who are not recognized as subjects and who receive 
this animal treatment [. . .] What one confusedly calls “animal,” 
the living thing as living and nothing more, is not a subject of 
the law or of right. (246)
 10
 
Because the human law does not include the animal as a proper subject to 
begin with, dehumanising or animalising tactics can be employed with 
impunity in many different scenarios. Human subjects, such as terrorists, 
prisoners-of-war, or any other social others, are projected into the signifying 
field of the animal within this judicial economy, treated as mere living objects, 
“the living thing as living and nothing more,” to be subjected to the 
disciplinary regimes of the social order.  
 Indeed, in Flesh, Simon recounts a trial that betrays the inferior status 
accorded to the PDS sufferers under the human law: “The Ravenshead 
massacre. A man went on a shooting spree in his own hometown. Shot ten 
Undead people in the head. He gets five years, because the judge says that the 
partially deceased people were only half a person” (Season 2, Episode 1). 
Within this judicial algorithm, the PDS sufferer‟s subjectivity is calculated, 
albeit arbitrarily, to be “half” the value of a person. As the law only recognises 
and measures human loss, the relatively light five-year sentence given to the 
                                                          
10
 Derrida acknowledges that in some cultures, the animal is recognised to some extent as a 
subject of the law, but argues that such examples are “considered to be either archaisms or still 
marginal and rare phenomena not constitutive of our culture” (246-7) In other words, they are 




human murderer is made commensurate with the “half-human” status of the 
PDS victims; the other half of the PDS sufferer‟s subjectivity, the nonhuman 
animal half, is, however, unaccounted for within this equation.  
 A crucial and powerful scene exemplifies how the PDS sufferer is 
implicated by this logic of the animal as a non-subject of the law. Bill Macy, 
the leader of the vigilante group Human Volunteer Force, is indiscriminate in 
his killing of the rotters. To him, the rotter and the PDS sufferer are the same: 
"A rotter is a rotter—drugs or no drugs" (Season 1, Episode 1). When he 
receives a tip-off that a PDS sufferer has returned to Roarton, he goes on a 
witch-hunt and finds Maggie Burton in her house. Initially, Bill was unable to 
pull the trigger on Maggie kneeling before him as he recognises the uncanny 
resemblance of her eyes: “Why do your eyes look like mine?” (Season 1, 
Episode 1). He then instructs Maggie to remove her contact lenses to reveal 




Fig. 14. Screenshot from In the Flesh (Season 1, Episode 1). Maggie Burton removes her contact lenses 




The evocative power of the scene lies in the chasm between how the audience 
and Bill perceive Maggie and her death. The audience is led to view her death 
as murder while Bill sees it as a just execution of a monstrous zombie. For the 
audience, the use of close-up, Balázs argues, acts as a form of “visual 
anthropomorphism,” in which the uncanny objects, Maggie‟s PDS eyes, are 
humanised—“a human soul [breathed] into them” (316). Wolfe argues that the 
eye is the “privileged sensory apparatus of the Freudian „human‟” (176), one 
of the privileged sites of humanity. When literarily transposed on to the 
nonhuman other as the humanised eye, it allows one to acknowledge and 
“recognis[e] the being of the nonhuman other” (153). This shot focuses on 
Maggie‟s humanised PDS eyes and her returned gaze, as well as her poignant 
smiling expression, to evoke audience sympathy when witnessing Maggie‟s 
impending execution and recognising it as an act of murder. 
Yet for Bill, things are different. In removing her contact lenses and 
revealing the perceived animality of the PDS eyes beneath the human disguise, 
Maggie performs the ceremony of peeling away the last vestige of humanity to 
secure the distinction, at least to Bill, between him and her as human and 
nonhuman zombie. Her perceived animality can therefore be monstrified. 
Indeed, throughout Flesh, the PDS eyes and their distinctly constricted and 
distorted pupils form a recurring motif that powerfully generates affective 
moments of not only uncanny dissonance but also ambivalent empathy. In 
Shelley‟s Frankenstein, the eyes of the creature, Petsche argues, meet and 
return Victor‟s gaze (101): “His eyes, if eyes they may be called, were fixed 
on me” (Shelley 40). Victor is repulsed by the creature‟s “dull yellow eyes” 
(Shelley 38) and their signification of animality “in the form of [the creature‟s] 
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gaze” (Petsche 101). Bill, on the other hand, unlike Victor Frankenstein, finds 
murderous comfort, even pleasure, in the uncanny dissonance of Maggie‟s 
inhuman eyes, commenting “that‟s more like it” (Season 1, Episode 1) after 
Maggie removes her lenses. Not only does this act affirm Maggie‟s “inherent” 
nonhuman otherness, but it also affirms his own humanity and sense of self-
righteousness in dispensing justice, that is, in exterminating the monstrous 
other. The perceived difference of the eyes, which translates into a warped 
sense of ontological difference and ethical pretext, opens up what Derrida calls 
a place for a “noncriminal putting to death” (“Eating Well” 112) of Maggie. 
According to this logic, Bill is thus able to “assert his desire to retain his 
„human nature‟ over and against the animality that is observing him” (Petsche 
102), as well as to execute Maggie with impunity, without becoming a 
murderer. Bill in fact believes it to be just for him to kill Maggie, for she is—
or was, he does not care—an animalistic monster, and the animal is not a 
subject of the law. At the end of the first season, Bill is shot point blank by 
Ken Burton, Maggie‟s husband, because the law fails to punish Bill for the 
murder of Maggie, as well as for Bill‟s act of filicide for killing his own PDS 
son Rick. The need for vigilantism to restore justice that the law fails to pursue 
confirms once again the helpless animal status—and of the animal in 
general—of the PDS sufferer under the human law. 
 
2.4.  Flesh-eating ideologies and humanormativity 
The opening scene of the first season of Flesh begins with an eating 
scene in the abandoned supermarket of a zombie-infested world; two female 
soldiers, Lisa and Jem, of the Human Volunteer Force, an anti-zombie task 
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force, are having a merry banter over the walkie-talkie in separate venues on 
what to “pilfer” for snacks. Ostensibly exhilarated from the sense of freedom 
accorded by the anarchic situation, Lisa takes a joy ride on the supermarket 
trolley down the long aisle and accidentally runs headlong into a couple of 
zombies (who happen to be Kieren and Amy). Similar to witnessing an act of 
animal slaughter or culinary preparation, the rabid rotters grab her by the 
shoulder, smash her head purposefully against the shelf several times—like 
cracking open a nut—to reveal and relish the gastronomical contents inside 
her skull (refer to fig. 15). The initial scene of comfort eating is quickly turned 
against the audience into a disconcerting display of monstrous cannibalism.  
From the outset, Flesh establishes the eating motif, in its several dietary 
variations, as one of the main sources of tension and anxiety in the text, 
recognising its ideological capacity to disrupt the anthropocentric social order. 
The rabid rotter‟s very specific diet is a streamlined attack on the core of this 
order; unlike traditional zombies that feed on the rest of the human body, the 
rabid rotters in Flesh feed only on the brain. The human brain, being the seat 
of intellectual and emotional faculties—and which, according to Petsche, are 
the very elements for establishing human superiority over the nonhuman 
animal (104)—thus becomes a site in which the zombies symbolically resist 
anthropocentrism and speciesism—simply by eating the ideologically 
productive organ and only it.  
The human species‟ answer to this threat is Neurotriptyline, a state-
endorsed chemical used to suppress the cannibalistic desires of the rabid rotter. 
Unlike the morally motivated Gothic vegetarianism of sympathetic vampires 





Fig. 15. Screenshots from In the Flesh (Season 1, Episode 1). Kieren has occasional flashbacks of Amy 
and him as rabid rotters killing Lisa by swinging her head repeatedly against the shelf. Kieren then tears 
open the back of the head and feeds on the cranial content. 
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control. As a disciplinary measure, this chemically-induced sacrifice of the 
PDS sufferer‟s cannibalism preserves the sanctity of humans, preventing them 
from being reduced to a meat-thing stripped of all humanity. As a resistance to 
this enforced discipline, the opposite drug, Blue Oblivion, converts the PDS 
sufferer back to a state of temporary rabidity. The drug returns the 
cannibalistic desires locked away, symbolically granting the rabid rotter a 
liberating window that is being politically abused in extremist forms against 
speciesist institutions and the innocent humans.  
Because of the dietary control, the PDS sufferer does not actually need 
to eat for sustenance, nor can they take any human food. “Solids and liquids,” 
Amy explains, “are toxic” (Season 1, Episode 2) to PDS sufferers, resulting in 
violent orificial discharges. Not only is eating unnaturally curbed, human food 
is thus also portrayed as unnatural to the PDS bodies, where the bodily 
rejection of such human food—not necessarily animal meat—symbolically 
challenges the anthropocentric order that naturalises the consumption of such 
food. Unnatural non-eating also creates a split within the PDS subject; the 
latter is neither an animal-eating human, nor a human-eating zombie. Besides 
sacrificing its cannibalistic desires, the PDS sufferer is denied access to the 
food chain altogether and its attendant power structure—of which it would 
have been at the apex above the human because of its potential cannibalism. It 
falls outside of the conventional system of subjectivity based on dietary 
ideologies. The PDS sufferer then cannot be a full subject, but it is also 
precisely the case because it is the embodiment of a liminal subject that is 
“sliding constantly along a series of differences, including those that are 
thought to separate human from animal” (Calarco 142). The PDS sufferer‟s 
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non-eating and liminality thus reveal the hollowness of eating ideologies in 
securing human subjectivities.  
The PDS sufferer, however, is able to indulge in animal‟s brain as a 
form of recreational drug. At a PDS party at the Lambert Farm, Amy explains 
to Kieren why she takes sheep's brains: "Cos they make you feel amazing! 
They're not human brains, anyway, just sheep's brains, want some? (Season 2, 
Episode 2). In this sense, the PDS sufferer‟s recreational carnivorism—a 
situational practice akin to social drinking—and non-eating for sustenance can 
then be considered a partial version of Gothic vegetarianism, as humans are 
not taken as food and it is morally acceptable, as reasoned by Amy, to have 
animal‟s brain rather than human‟s, even if only for recreation, rather than for 
sustenance.  
In Warm Bodies, however, the Corpses eat human brains for 
sustenance and pleasure. In one scene, after killing Julie‟s boyfriend Perry, R 
indulges in his brains to get “his memories, his thoughts, [and] his feelings,” 
commenting that “the brain‟s the best part. The part that makes [him] feel 
human again.” Later, while enjoying vicariously Perry‟s memories, R comes 
to the moment where he sees, from his victim‟s point of view, himself killing 
Perry and immediately spits out the brain. Clearly, though he cannot resist 
eating cannibalistically as “the new hunger [that the Corpses experience] is a 
very powerful thing,” he is still capable of being morally conflicted by his own 
murderous deed. Rejecting the brain then becomes R‟s symbolic alignment 
with the anthropocentric species order of not treating the human as a source of 
food. 
Indeed, such speciesist tendencies can be found in Flesh where it tries 
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to lodge the animal at the base of the food chain, securing its place below the 
human. In an earlier scene (refer back to Fig. 13), a pair of father-daughter 
rabid rotters performs Gothic vegetarianism by feeding on a sheep instead of a 
human. As discussed in the previous chapter, this scene exemplifies the 
zombie‟s “mimetic replication” of humanity. In light of the sheep carcass on 
the ground, this “mimetic replication” of the zombies‟ human past essentially 
replicates the scene of a family meal, where the animal is invariably the source 
of food on the table. Despite the textual coding of the rabid rotter with the 
discourse of animality, this scene effectively reasserts the real animal‟s 
position at the bottom of the species hierarchy—the human in between the 
animal and the carnivorous and cannibalistic rabid rotter at the top—as the 
ultimate object of “carnivorous sacrifice” in human culture (Grilli 49).  
In the post-apocalyptic world of Warm Bodies, the remaining humans 
keep livestock (refer to fig. 16) within their fortress as their source of food to 
mark a dietary, and hence ontological, distinction from the cannibalistic 
Corpses and Boneys. Although these are casual images dotting R‟s heroic 
journey of “rescuing” Julie, they nonetheless form an integral part of the 
natural(ised) scene of a human community re-establishing itself where animals 
are unquestioningly posited at the bottom of the food chain. Carnivorism is 
then not only an essential survival tactic, but also a coping mechanism for the 
metaphysical crisis of humanity within this dystopian context, where the 
human population is dwindling and being preyed on by other nonhuman 
species. When Julie tries to reason with her father that the Corpses are 
potentially rehumanising and hence losing their cannibalistic desires, he retorts 





Fig. 16. Screenshots from Warm Bodies. When R sneaks into the human fortress, he passes by livestock 
such as the cows (top) and kids (bottom) that are bred as sources of food for the remaining human 
population within.  
 
They don‟t eat broccoli. They eat brains, your mother‟s and your boyfriend‟s 
included.” While the statement satirises the concept of Gothic vegetarianism 
with the recent surge of sympathetic monsters, it also reveals the underlying 
fear and anxieties of humans becoming a source of food for the nonhuman 
other, which would then collapse the already crumbling carnivorist and 
species order of the human stronghold.   
 If the PDS sufferer‟s non-eating were a voluntary moral choice, the 
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closest character that would exercise an authentic version of Gothic 
vegetarianism would be Kieren. Plagued by the numerous flashbacks of his 
past cannibalistic deed, Kieren is filled with moral repugnance of his eating 
trauma. In a confession to Jem, he expresses deep remorse and guilt about 
killing Lisa:  
It feels awful. I‟m not one of those who thinks that what we did 
was all right because it was necessary for our survival, or that 
we were somehow some advanced species, so killing the living 
doesn‟t count. It does count. I did kill her. And all that I can say 
is that I would have done anything to have stopped it. (Season 
1, Episode 3) 
His moral reproach is, however, problematic because his feelings and 
obligations are only directed towards the humans; when a couple of rabid 
rotters are caged in the medical institution, he keeps his distance from them to 
avoid being reminded of his animalistic past. In his efforts to recuperate his 
own humanity, animality becomes a necessary sacrifice, reinforcing the 
speciesist basis of Gothic vegetarianism.  
Eating in any socially sanctioned dietary manner is a humanormative 
practice. As Gruen argues, “humanormativity, akin to heteronormativity (and 
later homonormativity), is the view that humans are the gauge or normative 
measure against which others are judged deficient, deviant, lacking” (213). To 
allay humanormative anxieties, Warm Bodies is keen to quickly reinstate 
Julie‟s species status as a human right after she wakes up on the first day of 
being “imprisoned” overnight in R‟s empty airplane. The first thing she says 
to him is that she is “starved” and the scenes that follow are images of 
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humanormative eating (refer to fig. 17).  The text is thus able to re-establish 
Julie‟s biological, and hence ontological, status as a human through this 
particular form of eating, a ritual that R, who does not share the same dietary 
preference as her, can only watch on in nostalgia and admiration of how 




Fig. 17. Screenshots from Warm Bodies. Julie finds a can of “fruit cocktail” and is offered a bottle of 





Eating in Flesh is, however, also used as a device for maintaining 
humanormative facade of the PDS reality. When Kieren returns to his home, 
he is asked to sit down for his first meal as a PDS sufferer with his parents. 
His mum Sue has cooked his favourite “lamb,” but when he replies that he 
“does not eat anymore,” she begs him to “pretend for a little bit.” (Season 1, 
Episode 1). For Kieren‟s parents, eating carnivorously is eating normally as a 
human being; pretending to eat carnivorously then becomes a necessary form 
of self-delusional assurance that Kieren still retains facets of his past human  
self. In the context of his loving family, pretending to eat the same animal, or 
humanormative eating, as Principle argues, erodes “the species difference and 
dominion that carnivorism is meant to enforce” (“(M)eating” 27). Later, 
species difference is indeed revealed to be non-contingent on their 
unconditional love for him, as Sue declares that she “would love [Kieren] with 
all her heart even if [he] came back as a goldfish” (Season 1, Episode 3). The 
proverbial sacrificial lamb, as literalised on the dining table of the Walker 
family (refer to fig. 18), is thus used as a coping mechanism to not only deflect 
their fear of Kieren‟s potential cannibalism but also to normalise Kieren‟s 
PDS condition by engaging the speciesist, humanity-assuring ideology of 
carnivorism. 
Amy, on the other hand, does not resort to humanormative eating as 
she feels secure about her PDS identity. She, however, regains human 
hunger—not hunger for human—over time. At one point, Amy intuitively 
responds to her hunger pang and ransacks the kitchen for food. After taking a 





Fig. 18. Screenshot from In the Flesh (Season 1, Episode 1). After the conversation, the camera pans 
down to this lamb dish on the table prepared by Kieren‟s mum Sue.  
 
immediately spits it out with disgust and exclaims, “What am I doing?” 
(Season 2, Episode 4)—only this time, it is a voluntary, and not an involuntary 
bodily, rejection of food. Having grown anti-humanormative owing to the 
influence of the Undead Liberation Army, Amy recognises and resists naming 
and eating as normativising strategies of the human species to domesticate the 
PDS sufferers. Later, however, at a village fete on a date with Philip, Amy 
forgetfully indulges in a toffee apple. When questioned by Philip‟s mum, Amy 
replies, smiling, “I forgot. I‟m PDS. Course. I don‟t eat. Whoops!” (Season 2, 
Episode 6), before pretending to throw up. Amy‟s dietary change signals the 
beginning of her rehumanisation. Her unwitting moments of lapsing into her 
natural human diet and her surprised reaction suggest the instrumental role of 
eating in ideologically constructing one‟s identity. More importantly, her 
instinctual desire for human food such as the yoghurt bar and toffee apple 
secures her position as a human in the species hierarchy. The initial fear of 
potential cannibalism and the need to sustain the illusion of humanormativity 
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are now replaced with the affirming rehumanisation of the PDS sufferer. The 
speciesist order is thus dietarily restored.  
 Although the PDS sufferer‟s eating desires are suppressed, it does not  
stop Rick from forcing himself to participate in the humanormative act of 
eating against his own PDS nature. Rick is in deep denial of his PDS status 
and pretends that he is still a normal human. For him, humanormative eating is 
to drink alcohol as he did when he was human. As an ex-soldier who died in 
the war, he conforms to the heteropatriarchal codes of drinking in the hyper-
masculine pub Legion frequented by the male soldiers of the Human 
Volunteer Force (HVF). Bill Macy, his father, frequently plies him with cans 
of beer and even teases him in the pub on one occasion: “Talking about Vicky 
Barnes, you horny git? This one here (Gary) was making the moves while you 
were serving Queen and country, eh? [. . .] (Passes him an alcoholic shot) Get 
that down you. Kill the heartache” (Season 1, Episode 2). Indeed, the Legion, 
as Kieren explains, is “not just a pub” for drinking only; it is also an 
ideological space that not only reinforces heteropatriarchal but also 
heterosexist values. When he was still a human, Kieren was “barred for life” 
from the pub and “hated” by the soldiers because “[he] wasn‟t like them” 
(Season 1, Episode 2). The heterosexist environment is confirmed when Gary, 
one of the HVF members, interrogates Amy and suggests that “Girls‟ 
Grammar” is filled with “lezzies” (Season 1, Episode 2). He then turns his 
attention to Kieren, the feminised male with artistic talents, commenting that 
“he‟d fit right in” (Season 1, Episode 2) the girls‟ school. Whether it is 
drinking or the conversation topic, the Legion, as a space for consumption, 
reinforces the discriminatory tendencies of heteronormativity against 
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femininity and homosexuality. More importantly, these tensions in relation to 
normative gender and sexuality are played out on the terrain of 
humanormativity. When Amy and Kieren enter the Legion, they are escorted 
to a “segregated area” (Season 1, Episode 2) in the back room, away from the 
humanormative drinking area. Incidentally, it is there at the “segregated area” 
that Kieren bumps into Rick, who was in a clandestine gay relationship with 
him when they were human. Rick not only has to perform being human, but 
also heterosexual in front of his father and the male soldiers. Forcing himself 
to drink, in this case, and engaging in the homophobic conversation—he 
laughs at Gary‟s joke—thus allows him to align himself with the human-, 
heteronormative codes of the Legion, and to hide in the safety of his human-, 
heterosexual mask.  
The borrowing of the species discourse of humanormative eating as a 
platform for articulating the discourse of human sexuality is evident in another 
scene. In the second season, another more successful romance presents itself 
to Kieren in the form of Simon, an openly PDS sufferer who refuses to wear 
the human mask. On one occasion, however, in order to get to know Kieren‟s 
“world” better, Simon complies with his request to put on human make-up. 
When Simon meets his parents, Kieren‟s father Steve addresses him as 
Kieren‟s “mate,” a platonic term that suggests Steve‟s ignorance of the true 
nature of their relationship. The luncheon does not pan out well for the gay 
PDS couple, as they are joined by a contrasting heterosexual human couple, 
Jem (Kieren‟s sister) and Gary, who are both members of the Human 
Volunteer Force (refer to fig. 19). During the meal, in a maliciously deliberate 





Fig. 19. Screenshot from In the Flesh (Season 2, Episode 4).  Two opposing sets of couple—gay PDS 
(on the top right) and heterosexual human (bottom left)—are seated across the table having family 
luncheon with the parents. Kieren‟s dad, Steve Walker, stops him mid-way in his description of his 
cannibalistic cravings when he was in his untreated state.  
 
with Jem. While this happens Steve tries repeatedly to divert the subject by 
commenting on the food. Everyone except Gary at the table is visibly 
uncomfortable but it takes Kieren‟s retaliation of an unsettling recount of his 
solitary, fearful “coming out of the casket” experience and his impassioned 
description of his subsequent cannibalistic hunger before Steve finally bursts 
out in anger and calls for a time-out: “That‟s enough! Do you hear me? I will 
not have it” (Season 2, Episode 4). The juxtaposition in this scene of Gary‟s 
story on the killing of reanimated corpses with Kieren‟s on the desire to eat 
human corpses reveals speciesist bias and anxieties; talking at length about the 
legitimate killing of rabid rotters—which, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
is a form of symbolic anthropophagy—is uncomfortable but ignorable, as 
“normal” as the culling of animals; while the mere mention of cannibalism 
instantly crosses the line. Even though Simon and Kieren try to disguise 
themselves as “normal” humans to create a conducive, humanormative 
environment, they still fail to level the playing field of pleasing the parents. 
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Kieren‟s retort succinctly captures this bias: “Did I cross the line, Dad? While 
they sit around and high-five each other about killing us like it‟s a big joke! 
Oh no, that‟s fine with everyone! I say one thing and that is indecent? I‟m 
sorry, but that is bullshit!” (Season 2, Episode 4). Between the two couples, 
one heterosexual human while the other gay and pseudo-human, the latter 
couple does not stand a chance as their PDS selves eventually come back to 
haunt them via Gary‟s ill-meaning antagonism. In a way, the speciesist 
anxieties over cannibalism echo that of a homosexual panic. Zombieness thus 
becomes the meat shield, in place of homosexuality, for the expressed 
disapproval of Steve. The species discourse serves as a dramatised “off site” in 
testing normative limits, for this scene could well have been between a 
“normal” gay couple and a straight human couple, with the discourse of 
homosexuality taking the heat all on its own. The potential problematisation of 
heteronormativity is thus deflected on to a critique of the species discourse of 
humanormativity.  
 
2.5.  The species(ist) closet: coming-out narratives of queer sexualities 
Flesh is a literary performance of the “carnivorous sacrifice” of the 
animal. The text deploys the species discourse, evoked through the zombie-
animal dyadic code, to reopen and solve issues concerning discourses of the 
human. It is an epistemological exploitation—even epistemic violence—of 
animality, materialised in sound and image on the screen. In Gothic parlance, 
Flesh wears the layer of species discourse over its own flesh as a human 




In Flesh, species is paired with human sexuality: Kieren, as well as two 
other romantically linked PDS characters, Rick and Simon, is a gay PDS 
sufferer. The first season explores the closeted romance between Kieren and 
Rick. Here, the repressive discourse of homosexuality finds refuge in the 
narrative of closetedness, where the full expression of homosexual desires is 
constantly disrupted and truncated. Indeed, throughout the first season, the 
expression of homosexual desires is constantly suppressed to align with the 
ultra-conservative climate of Roarton Valley. Several elements hint strongly at 
the taboo status of homosexuality and the covert relationship between Kieren 
and Rick. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Legion pub is a 
heterosexist and homophobic place. Other suggestive parts include the 
meaningful shot-reverse-shot of Kieren looking wistfully at an Expressionist 
painting of Rick drawn by him, as well as the stashed away photograph of 
them together when they were still human. When Kieren and Rick finally meet 
for the first time as PDS sufferers at the Legion, Rick nervously opens with a 
casual “All right, mate?” (Season 1, Episode 2) and offers a platonic 
handshake that contrasts poignantly with their quivering lips and meaningful 
looks, betraying the intensity of their inexpressible affection for each other in 
this dangerously anti-gay environment. In the final episode of the first season, 
while warning Kieren about Bill‟s plan to assassinate him, Rick‟s phone call 
gets cut short—“Ren, about last night, I‟m really . . .” (Season 1, Episode 3)—
at the slight possibility of a romantic confession. The narrative deliberately 
curtails a fuller expression of homosexuality to reinforce the atmosphere of 
closetedness; a necessary move to bottle up the repressive energies in the first 
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season, only to set them free in the second, to perform, in gay rights parlance, 
the emancipatory ritual of coming out of the closet. 
The coming-out narrative in Flesh is structured by the interplay 
between the discourses of species and human sexuality. In particular, the text 
employs the motifs of masking and unmasking to trace the metaphoric and 
metonymic movements of both discourses. In a speech to a group of PDS 
sufferers, each with their own insecurities, Simon, the twelfth disciple of the 
Undead Prophet, preaches on the oppressive regime of the living and the 
empowering effects of liberation: 
I went down to the GP surgery today. They had two rabids 
there, locked up in a cage, that they‟re going to send away for 
treatment so that they can teach them to integrate, to be what 
the living demand. I found myself looking at them, wondering 
how long they were going to be in that cage. Huh. How long 
are you going to be in your cage? What‟s stopping you from 
being the people you are? Instead of copies of who you used to 
be. Of what they tell you you have to be. Why don‟t you break 
free? Why don‟t you show yourselves? Because when you do, 
when you finally do, I promise you‟re not going to want to go 
back. Because you‟re going to be beautiful, you‟re going to be 
flawless. You‟re going to be the future. (Season 2, Episode 3) 
Human make-up is metaphorised as a “cage” that entraps true selves, an 
unnatural human skin that PDS sufferers are obliged to wear as a mark of 
normality. For Kieren, this human skin-cage not only suppresses his sexuality, 
but also acts as a defensive mechanism to mitigate his deep shame about 
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himself, a result of detrimental social conditioning. In his closeted state, 
Kieren religiously puts on his human mask, wearing his contact lenses and 
excessive cover-up mousse to conceal his true self, or selves (refer to fig. 20). 
If we characterise the allegorical dynamics between species and sexuality in 
terms of a corresponding surface/underground, outside/inside binary, Kieren 
(and Rick, to be discussed below) as a PDS sufferer is an incarnation of the 
repressed, closeted homosexual; his masking ritual and his human exterior are 
thus the performance and facade of heterosexuality respectively. 
 Staying masked ensures safety against the anti-PDS extremists. The 
consequences are dire as one of the unmasking acts of the series, performed by 
Rick, ends in tragedy. Both Rick and his father, Bill Macy, a radically anti-
PDS vigilante, are in deep denial about Rick‟s PDS status. At one point, Bill 
tries to persuade Rick to kill Kieren, engaging the rhetoric of animality: 
“When you‟ve finished him, say something like, „When I met up with the 
Walker lad, he started foaming at the mouth.‟ Something like that. He‟s not a 
person, Rick. He‟s an animal. Worse than an animal. They might walk and 
talk, but rotters are evil” (Season 1, Episode 3). In a desperate attempt to 
appeal to his father‟s sense of empathy and love for him to spare Kieren‟s life, 
Rick unmasks his human make-up to reveal his true zombie self and pleads 
with his father: “I don‟t want to hurt Ren. He‟s me best mate. If Ren‟s evil, 
Dad, then so am I” (Season 1, Episode 3). This is the furthest the first season  
goes in having Rick confess some kind of affection for Kieren, which is a 
highly dangerous attempt considering that his father is an irrational 
fundamentalist. Unable to articulate his gay desires directly, Rick borrows his 





Fig. 20. Screenshots from In the Flesh (Season 2, Episode 1). Before removing his human make-up, 




coming-out process. In his analysis of Hemingway‟s works, Wolfe argues that 
the species discourse is sometimes used as an “off site” to solve or reopen 
“problems of race or gender [. . .] recoded as problems of species” (124). In 
this context, the gay allegory of zombieness allows the latter to serve as an 
 “off site” to resolve Rick‟s sexual issues of being a closeted gay. Although 
Bill eventually kills his son in cold blood, exorcising both the zombie and the 
gay in him, Rick dies having come to terms with his true selves and 
reciprocated his love for Kieren, which he initially kept concealed, in this 
courageously suicidal sacrifice against his religiously brainwashed father.  
 The coming-out process for Kieren has a more positive tone to it. In 
the second season, following the failed luncheon, Kieren, in a fit of 
indignation, performs the ceremony of unmasking himself. He then proceeds 
to wipe away Simon‟s cover-up mousse in a suggestive manner (refer to fig. 
21), signalling not only his acceptance of Simon‟s openness about his PDS 
status which he used to resent, but also the blossoming of their romantic 
relationship. Kieren‟s anger at his family‟s apparent discrimination against his 
PDS nature propels him to embrace his zombie self out of defiance. In 
exteriorising this one true zombie self, Kieren unlocks the allegorical code of 
the other true self, that of his sexuality—a reading enabled by the 
synchronised metonymic movements of the gay and zombie signifiers within 
the allegorical narrative of the text. Kieren‟s gay identity, which is symbolised  
by the zombie surrogate now fully externalised, is thus laid bare—in fact, this 
sexual awakening has already been foreshadowed in the earlier parts of the 
second season where Kieren takes the initiative to kiss Simon twice on 





Fig. 21. Screenshots from In the Flesh (Season 2, Episode 4).  Kieren removes his contact lenses and 
wipes away his human make-up, signalling the beginning of him embracing his PDS self. The cross in 
the background provides an apt religious subtext to the institutionalisation of true selves and desires. He 
then helps Simon wipe off his cover-up mousse as well. 
 
unmasking ceremony, it is made known to us that Kieren has officially come 
to terms with his sexuality too.   
 The manner in which this coming-out discourse is executed is, 
however, deeply problematic as it perpetuates speciesist logic. Initially,  
desires of eating and sexuality overlap, where suppressed cannibalism is 
transcoded allegorically with repressed homosexuality. Yet in this coming-out 
process, only the homosexual desire receives liberation, while the cannibalistic 
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desire remains suppressed. In fact, with hints of Kieren‟s potential 
rehumanisation later in the series, his cannibalistic desire looks to be removed 
altogether. The asymmetry in these coupled discourses suggests that the 
sexuality “problem” can only be solved in the domain of humanormativity, 
while the threatening element of cannibalism needs to be kept at bay. 
Cannibalistic desire thus cannot be metonymically unlocked together with 
sexual desire within the allegorical structure because of the speciesist logic 
that animality, associated with cannibalism itself, needs to be sacrificed for 
anthropocentric purposes. In unmasking his human disguise to reveal the 
zombie self, Kieren is ironically found to be wearing yet another layer of skin, 
belonging to that of the toothless—literally and figuratively, because of the 
suppressed cannibalism—zombie species—like an animal skin for utilitarian 
reasons—to express his sexual identity as a human. Kieren‟s closet, as well as 
his freedom from it, is thus essentially predicated on the speciesist sacrifice of 
the nonhuman other.   
 The romantic relationship between Amy Dyer and Philip Wilson adds 
another dimension to the dynamics between the discourses of species and 
sexuality: Philip, a human, is a councillor of the anti-PDS parish who happens 
to desire Amy, a PDS sufferer. During a protest outside the brothel, however, 
he publicly declares his support for the PDS sufferers, provoking outrage 
against him. Below is an image of the banner held by one of the protestors 






Fig. 22. Screenshot from In the Flesh (Season 2, Episode 4). A protest scene outside the PDS brothel. A 
staunchly religious protester is seen carrying a banner that reads: “If a man lie with a.” 
 
 The readable words on the banner recall the oft-quoted passage from the bible 
most commonly cited in anti-gay religious discourse for justifying the 
condemnation of same-sex relations by reducing the latter to the sexual act: "If 
a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have 
committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall 
be upon them." (King James Version, Lev. 20.13; emphasis in the original). 
The framing of the shot teasingly cuts the banner off right before the object of 
the clause "If a man lie with a," inviting the knowing audience to participate in 
the language game of swapping "mankind" with "PDS sufferer," and to 
recognise that the corresponding signifiers homosexuality and zombieness—
on top of their metaphorical connection established earlier—occupy the same 
metonymic position of otherness in the biblical quote. More importantly, 
though this quote is typically used to condemn two homosexual men, when 
put in the context of this scene, the target becomes that of the heterosexuals 
engaging in cross-species fornication. Equivalence is drawn, through these 
81 
 
interchangeable signifiers, in the sexual acts between two homosexual men 
and, between a heterosexual human and PDS sufferer. The heteronormative 
centre in the biblical quote shifts from a focus on heterosexuality alone to that 
of heterosexuality within the same species. Heteronormativity is subsumed 
within—eaten by—the larger discourse of humanormativity. One could even 
go so far as to argue that species precedes sexuality in a heteronormative 
regime, as the latter is automatically assumed to be the sole domain of the 
human species. The taken-for-grantedness of the species discourse in 
heteronormativity could also explain why the sexual taboos between the 
human and nonhuman other are more deeply repressed than some of the other 
queer sexualities in human cultures. 
 Just as homosexuality is queer by heteronormative standards, so is 
cross-species heterosexuality. Philip is fully aware of the social taboo of being 
with a PDS sufferer, yet he cannot suppress his queer heterosexual desires for 
Amy. His desire may easily be dismissed as the result of the fetishisation of 
the PDS condition, which is likely to be the case for most of the human 
patrons who seek those PDS sex workers. Philip, on the other hand, explains 
that he does not "fancy people with PDS as such" (Season 2, Episode 4), and, 
in a later confession, reassures Amy that he likes her for herself, "dead or 
alive" (Season 2, Episode 6). Queer heterosexuality, as portrayed in the text, 
evokes overtones of necrophilia and bestiality. These are self reflexively 
foregrounded in a scene where Amy teases Philip, after his public declaration 
at the protest scene, that "[his] reputation is in tatters, what with necrophilia 
and fancying rotters" (Season 2, Episode 4). The text draws some of its anti-
PDS energy from these overtones, reflecting the deep-seated anxieties of 
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sexual taboos in humanist cultures where speciesist boundaries are drawn in 
relation to the sexual conduct between the human and the dead or animal. The 
figure of the PDS sufferer, cast in the same signifying field as the dead and 
animal, is thus the hybrid embodiment of the object of desire in both 
necrophilia and bestiality. This demonstrates the instrumental role of 
sexuality, mediated through the species discourse, in constructing monstrosity 
and taboo. 
 Philip is in a closet of his own, one that is more repressive and subdued 
than Kieren‟s. His narrative arc can thus be also seen as enacting the text‟s 
coming-out desires. Sandwiched between his political ambitions to climb the 
“greasy pole” (Season 2, Episode 2) and his affection for Amy, Philip is 
forced to lead a double life; despite being a member of authority in the anti-
PDS movement in town, he engages in clandestine liaisons with Amy herself 
and later, with a PDS sex worker who has to pretend to be Amy as he wants a 
“full girlfriend experience” (Season 2, Episode 2). Eventually, after struggling 
with the moral dilemma of manipulating truths about the PDS sufferers, Philip 
decides to speak out against the witch-hunt at the protest scene outside the 
PDS brothel:   
I think we should stop this. I think we should all stop 
pretending. You can only pretend for so long, and you're back 
stuck with yourself. What I'm trying to explain is that, if the 
idea that you were ever a pure person, it just makes everything 
else so much worse. It makes you so disappointing. People 
aren't pure. We are not good any more than they're evil or 
they're inhuman. Maybe we only have to pretend they're bad 
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because we have to pretend that we're good. But if we could 
just express our real selves and live with who we really are and 
love ourselves, then maybe . . . maybe we could accept and live 
with and . . . and love. (Season 2, Episode 4) 
Philip then walks over to join the ranks of human patrons lined up against the 
wall to complete his public coming-out ritual. His coming-out, however, is 
only really complete when he makes his romantic confession to Amy in 
private shortly after the protest scene. On both public and private levels of the 
coming-out performance, Philip has come to terms with and expressed his 
queer heterosexual desires. More importantly, Philip is considered queer only 
because his heterosexuality is of a cross-species nature; an issue that he 
responds to directly in his speech. He politicises queer heterosexuality by 
subsuming it within a critique of speciesism—discrimination based on species. 
Rejecting firmly a purist notion of the human “person” used in constructing 
truths about morality against the “inhuman” other, he then moves on to 
poignantly evoke emancipatory notions of “real selves” in relation to coming 
out, either as a queer heterosexual, or as a PDS sufferer without having to 
wear human make-up. By speaking up for species difference, Philip‟s speech 
thus appears to be engaging an egalitarian and anti-speciesist rhetoric. 
This rhetoric is, however, problematic because Philip‟s species 
egalitarianism is derived on humanormative terms. Throughout his queer 
romance with Amy, there is no clear evidence of him embracing Amy‟s true 
PDS nature, that is, her cannibalistic desire and grotesque rabid rotter self, in 
its entirety. Although Amy does not wear her human disguise, revealing her 
PDS eyes, her PDS look is still a far cry from the transmogrified visage of her 
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animalistic self (refer back to fig. 4). Amy has only been consistently 
presented in a humanised light to Philip and it is also this identifiably “human” 
image of her that Philip falls in love with. Flashbacks of Amy as a monstrous 
rotter, on the other hand, are of a separate time and space from the later 
romantic scenes with Philip. The humanised, not animalistic, Amy is 
acceptable for the romance narrative. The audience is also oriented to identify 
with the humanormativised portrayal of their queer relationship and forget 
about the suppressed truths behind species difference. Amy‟s PDS animality 
still needs to be strictly kept out of this humanormativised “queer” 
relationship. Thus, when Philip at a later point comes out of his queer closet 
and speaks out about egalitarianism despite species difference, it can be 
deceptively convincing because the ideologies of humanormativity have 
already been worked into the portrayal of the queer romance, which, 
incidentally is the source of motivation for his coming-out speech. In this 
sense, this imperceptible manipulation counts as an “ideological feint” (Wolfe 
97)—a misleading move inspired by Carol Clover‟s “Final Girl” trope in 
horror narratives—within queer discourses: Philip‟s coming out speech is after 
all not as anti-speciesist, egalitarian, or queer as it is perceived to be.  
Both Kieren‟s and Philip‟s coming-out process demonstrates the 
exclusionary gaps of existing and “new” regimes. Whether it is the hegemonic 
coming-out discourse of the trending homonormative movement, or the 
decentring of the heteronormative within its own heterosexual construct, the 
same but “tacit” condition is that animality be cast as the contrastive notion to 




2.6.  The zombie pharmakos: love and sacrifice  
“The Second Rising will happen if the First Risen is sacrificed” (Season 
2, Episode 6), declares an emotional Maxine, the newly elected MP, to the 
people of Roarton. Earlier, she had brutally stabbed Amy in the heart, 
believing her to be the sacrificial lamb of the prophecy. Maxine wishes, but 
fails, to bring her dead younger brother back to life. In a separate scene, Simon 
jumps in front of Kieren to block a non-lethal gunshot. He releases the 
sacrificial knife from his grip, a weapon he initially meant but hesitated to use 
on Kieren whom he believes to be the First Risen.  
Maxine and Simon are two new characters of the second season 
deployed to set the sacrificial guillotine in motion. Despite having different 
motivations and backgrounds, one a political leader and the other the disciple 
of an occult group, they share the same goal of tracking down and sacrificing 
the First Risen, the first zombie to emerge from its grave during the First 
Rising. Whether for personal or religious reasons, love and sacrifice are 
necessarily intertwined. When Maxine blatantly murders Amy, and threatens 
later to “leav[e] no stone unturned” (Season 2, Episode 6) in killing every PDS 
sufferer who could be the First Risen, she becomes not just a criminal, but a 
psychotic and irrational extremist. She turns into a monstrous human with a 
pitiable story, driven by her deep familial love for her brother to the extreme 
act of murder, sacrificing the innocent. Even the humans find this level of 
violence against the PDS sufferers morally unacceptable. “She‟s tapped” 
(Season 2, Episode 6), comments a HVF member who strikes her with a Taser 
from behind when she strides towards a PDS sufferer in the crowd with a pair 
of scissors. In being portrayed as the “new” monster, deflecting monstrosity 
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away from the PDS sufferers, Maxine thus fails to justify her sacrificial 
crusade, however moving her personal tragedy may be. 
Maxine sees Amy, as well as other PDS sufferers who are potentially the 
First Risen, as simply a sacrificial object for resurrecting her beloved brother. 
The dilemma for Simon, however, is that his beloved Kieren is the sacrificial 
object itself. Earlier, Simon had already played the sacrificial role himself 
(refer back to fig. 11), where he was a guinea pig subjected to vivisection for 
finding a cure to the PDS condition. The sacrificial discourse of animality is 
thus already inscribed in the character. In choosing love over his religious 
mission at the pivotal moment, Simon does not reenact his own fate on Kieren; 
instead, he sees Kieren as his “human” lover proper, rather than an objectified 
sacrificial lamb for his religious convictions. Simon sacrifices sacrifice, 
something that the human scientists fail to do for him when they experiment 
unethically on him. This act of sacrificing sacrifice humanises Simon in 
contrast to the monstrified Maxine. What is even more ennobling about this 
abdication is that he is willing to risk his life in taking the bullet for Kieren. 
Maxine‟s inhuman sacrifice thus pales in comparison to Simon‟s heroic 
sacrifice, even though both acts are motivated by love.   
The themes of love and sacrifice share a similar synergy in Warm 
Bodies. As a rom-com, Warm Bodies is a combination of the romantic tropes 
in Disney‟s Beauty and the Beast and Shakespeare‟s Romeo and Juliet. R, a 
Corpse, falls in love at first sight with the human Julie during a hunt. He takes 
her back to an empty airplane he owns, “imprisoning” her for a few days, just 
as the Beast does Belle in his castle, and lies to her that it is not safe to leave 
when in fact he is keeping her for his own sake. Realising that she misses 
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home, he then sacrifices his selfish desires and releases her. When he later 
receives news that her life is in danger, he sneaks into the human fortress at his 
own peril to warn her, replicating the iconic balcony scene where the 
infatuated but unwelcome Romeo trespasses upon the Capulet property to find 
Juliet. Eventually, in a near-death encounter, R sacrificially uses his body to 
protect Julie when they jump off from a great height into a pool. Moved by his 
selfless act, Julie kisses R and the latter undergoes rehumanisation on the spot, 
reminiscent of the magical moment when the curse is lifted from the Beast by 
Belle‟s reciprocated love.  
All seems well with these humanised portrayals of romantic relationship, 
what with the humanist themes of love and sacrifice interweaving, until, of 
course, it is remembered that these relationships are essentially of a cross-
species nature. Love and sacrifice then take on a completely different register. 
In order for romance to be comfortably taken to its fruitful resolution, where 
the taboo overtones of necrophilia and bestiality are diffused, the monster in 
love needs to be rehumanised. In other words, the nonhuman monster in this 
humanised romance must be sacrificed to give way to a “pure” human 
romance—“pure” on the level of species. Although violence may be an 
integral aspect of the sacrificial acts involved in the pursuit of romantic love, 
the more sinister but repressed violence of sacrifice is actually inflicted on the 
nonhuman other. Romantic love is thus also necessarily a love for speciesist 
sacrifice in upholding this anthropocentric ideal.  
The ultimate sacrifice of the nonhuman other comes in the literalisation 
of the rehumanisation mythology—Amy and R literally become human again.   
At the close of Warm Bodies, Julie kisses R and his eyes turn colour (refer to 
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fig. 23). She pleads with her father and the soldiers not to fire at R, saying: 
“Please, Dad! Look at him. He‟s different. He‟s . . . Bleeding. He‟s bleeding, 
Dad. Corpses don‟t bleed! Oh, God. You‟re alive. He‟s alive!” On hearing that 
R is bleeding, Julie‟s father and the soldiers lower their guns, recognising that 
they are now facing a human—or rehumanised Corpse—and not a Corpse. In 
Flesh, Amy is declared to have lost too much blood after being stabbed by 




Fig. 23. Screenshots from Warm Bodies. After Julie kisses R, the latter experiences the biological 




examination, the doctor finds that "her pupils have changed" (Season 2, 
Episode 6), just like in the case of R. The changes in the eyes and the capacity 
to bleed mark the complete transformation of the rehumanised zombie, 
ideologically signalling a biological transition from one species to another, 
namely from the animalistic zombie to the “pure” human.  
Indeed, Gothic rehumanisation foregrounds nonhuman animality as an 
undesirable trait in the pursuit of humanist ideals. In one comedic scene, Amy 
requests that Philip perform “mercy killing” (Season 2, Episode 5), or as 
Germanà terms it, “sacrificially assisted suicide,” (65) on her to avoid the 
possibility of reverting to her animalistic self: “I don‟t want to live as a rabid, 
going around killing people without a thought in my head. That‟s no kind of 
life [. . .] Once I turn, I turn for good and then I‟m stuck. Stuck like that for 
ever. It‟s a fate worse than death. That‟s why I need you to put me down 
before I go rabid” (Season 2, Episode 5). Despite being a vivacious, "PDS and 
proud" (Season 1, Episode 2) character, Amy only embraces the human 
aspects of the treated PDS condition, the regained humanity, but fears rabidity 
to the point that she would rather die a humanised PDS sufferer than be a 
rotter.  
Besides her personal aversion to the rabid state, Amy‟s PDS animality 
is also deployed to reinstate the anthropocentric institution of legality. At the 
end of the attempted suicide scene, just before Philip is about to drive a 
screwdriver into her head, she starts to feel the raindrops, regaining physical 
sensation: “I can feel the rain. I can . . . I can feel it, Philip [. . .] I‟m feeling 
again. I‟m . . . I‟m not turning rabid” (Season 2, Episode 5). Because Amy 
eventually dies a human, she makes a criminal of Maxine. Flesh begins its 
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first season with the initial "noncriminal putting to death" of Maggie Burton 
and ends in the second season with this unambiguously "criminal" murder of 
Amy. By fully rehumanising Amy just before the point of murder, removing 
the zombie species out of her, the narrative allows for the full force of justice 
to be felt for the loss of the human Amy. Maxine Martin, towards the end, then 
receives her legal punishment in the form of imprisonment, while Bill in the 
first season almost goes scot-free for two murders (Maggie Burton and his son 
Rick), until he is shot down in a vigilante act. The reinscription of the human 
allows justice, otherwise lacking in the initial “noncriminal putting to death,” 
to be reinstalled in the series because the victim is now a human. The narrative 
of justice, however, is only possible with the concomitant abandonment of the 
zombie species. This substitution reinforces the fact that the zombie-animal is 
not a subject of the law and that it can be sacrificed with near impunity. Gothic 
rehumanisation thus enacts symbolic violence on the nonhuman other, but this 
violence is ideologically overshadowed by the humanist narratives, that is, the 
literal violence of the murder of a human and the overriding narrative of legal 
justice. Although justice is once again rendered to the human and order 
restored to humanity, they are achieved at the expense of the nonhuman 
zombie, following the speciesist logic on the need to sacrifice the nonhuman 
animal for anthropocentric interests.  
Warm Bodies also shows equal, if not greater, enthusiasm in wanting to 
purge animality from its humanist core through the narrative of Gothic 
rehumanisation. The process begins for R in the scene where he first 
encounters Julie. Later, during their escape from the Corpse-infested airport, 
Julie holds R‟s hand to walk through a throng of Corpses. Stupefied, the 
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Corpses look on without any sign of aggression. A large-scale rehumanisation 
occurs shortly after among the Corpses when, in a parallel mise-en-scène, they 
see a picture of a couple holding hands and start regaining memories of their 
past human relationships (refer to fig. 24). Inspired by their love, they follow 
R and Julie to warn them about the Boneys hunting the two of them down for 
“start[ing] something,” that is, a love revolution that is rehumanising the rest 




Fig. 24. Screenshots from Warm Bodies. The Corpses witness Julie and R holding hands initially, before 
seeing a picture of a similar scene elsewhere shortly after, triggering the process of rehumanisation in 




rehumanising Corpses thus march towards the human fortress, knowing the 
risks involved, in the name of love; more precisely, they march towards a 
beacon of hope to regain their lost humanity as defined by love, while the 
humans defend theirs from within. In a potential clash with the Corpses, the 
human soldiers rush to the scene only to find that the Corpses are already 
trying to fight off the Boneys that have infiltrated the “sacred” human city. It 
is a fight of and for humanity. When one of the soldiers asks “Who the hell do 
we shoot?”, one of the Corpses, M, slides a battered Boney over to them and 
replies with a friendly “hi,” establishing his remotely mutual humanness with 
the soldiers. An alliance is thereafter forged between the humans and Corpses 
against their common enemy—the purely animalistic Boneys. In the final 
voiceover, R calls this alliance a “really good bonding experience for [the 
Corpses] and the humans [and that] once [they] joined forces, the [Boneys] 
didn‟t stand a chance.” The merging of the rehumanising Corpses and the 
humans to ward off the Boneys thus becomes a metaphor for the concentration 
of humanity attempting to erase its other half, that of nonhuman animality. 
 Parental love is also implicated in this discourse of animality. When 
Kieren‟s mum Sue declares that she “would love [Kieren] with all her heart  
even if [he] came back as a goldfish” (Season 1, Episode 3), there is no doubt 
about her genuine maternal love; but her casual analogy does raise the 
question of the true extent to which she embraces Kieren‟s species otherness. 
Rick‟s mum Janet also speaks about how she has come to accept her son‟s 
species otherness during a sharing session:  
I‟m ashamed to admit it, but when Rick came back I was scared 
of him. Scared of me own flesh and blood. The way Vicar 
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Oddie put it, they‟re all supposed to be possessed by the devil 
himself. Demons in disguise. I haven‟t found that at all. My 
handsome man‟s back. He‟s different. He‟s a bit different 
looking, but he‟s still the same, deep down. You know I know 
that. My Ricky, he‟s a good boy. (Season 1, Episode 3)       
“I haven‟t found that at all”; indeed, neither mother has witnessed the 
specifically animalistic side of their PDS sons. It is under humanormative 
conditions—suppressed cannibalism and humanised visages—that they 
welcome back their sons. The completeness of parental love is, however, 
confirmed in the last episode of the series where Kieren‟s father Steve 
confronts a rabid Kieren who has been forced-fed Blue Oblivion. Steve walks 
right up to him with complete faith that Kieren is able to fight back his 
cannibalistic desire:  
He‟s not going to hurt anyone. He knows me. He knows me. 
He‟s fighting it. He‟s not gone. I know he‟s in there. I‟ve got to 
believe you can hear me, Kier. I know we haven‟t seen eye to 
eye lately. That doesn‟t mean I don‟t love you, no matter what 
you are. I was wrong but I know now. I won‟t let‟em take you 
away. You‟re my son. (Season 2, Episode 6)  
This is also the moment where the allegorical coding of zombieness and 
homosexuality kicks in again as a form of closure to allow a reading of Steve 
finally accepting Kieren‟s species and sexual otherness. But more importantly, 
this incident enshrines an ideal form of parental love. In being non-speciesist, 
Steve shows his parental love to be unconditional. Non-speciesism in this 
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narrow sense is thus merely used as a fictionalised condition for expressing the 
humanist ideal of unconditional parental love.    
The perennial anthropocentric theme of romantic love seems to be the 
motivation behind the literal rehumanisation of the nonhuman zombies. Just 
like in Warm Bodies, where love revitalises R to turn him back into a human, 
Kieren and Amy are the only two characters in Flesh to have found love and 
shown signs of being rehumanised. Jem (Kieren‟s sister), on the other hand, 
has a fleeting relationship with Gary and does not find love; in fact, her 
desperate need to conquer her irrational fear of the PDS sufferer leads her to 
mistakenly kill Henry Lonsdale who, ironically a PDS sufferer, has repeatedly 
expressed likings for her. As discussed, the ignoble aspect of this romantic 
love is, however, that it is predicated on the sacrifice of the nonhuman other. 
As Wolfe argues, "the full transcendence of the 'human' requires the sacrifice 
of the 'animal'" (43); human romance, one of the most sustained humanist 
enterprises in the history of mankind, is thus not only the driving force behind 
this transcendental project of rehumanising the zombie, but also the driving 
force behind the inevitable sacrifice of the nonhuman species. 
Gothic rehumanisation is thus speciesist sacrifice. Derrida‟s concept of 
the pharmakos in “Plato‟s Pharmacy” provides an apt image on the essence of 
this sacrificial ritual:  
The (rite of the) pharmakos was a purification of this sort of 
old. If a calamity overtook the city by the wrath of God, 
whether it were famine or pestilence or any other mischief, they 
led forth as though to a sacrifice the most unsightly of them all 
as a purification and a remedy to the suffering city. They set the 
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sacrifice in the appointed place, and gave him cheese with their 
hands and a barley cake and figs, and seven times they smote 
him with leeks and wild figs and other wild plants. Finally they 
burnt him with fire with the wood of wild trees and scattered 
the ashes into the sea and to the winds, for a purification, as I 
said, of the suffering city. (133) 
In ancient Greece, the pharmakoi were fed and allowed to parasite the 
majority, before being turned into objects of sacrifice to perform the ritual of 
purifying “the suffering city.” In truth, they were the ones being parasited on. 
They were in fact methodically fed—as with the animals in factory farming—
to be parasited on, or sacrificed, to deal with the crises of humanity, 
metaphorised as the “suffering city.” In this regard, the human fortress of 
Warm Bodies serves as an apt metaphor for the ontological state of humanity 




Fig. 25. Screenshot from Warm Bodies. An aerial, extreme long shot of the fortified home base in the 
middle of the city where the remaining humans hole up. The rest of the city outside these walls is either 




being destructive to the threatening nonhuman other. Derrida explains this 
defence mechanism, stating that 
The city‟s body proper thus reconstitutes its unity, closes 
around the security of its inner courts, gives back to itself the 
word that links it with itself within the confines of the agora, by 
violently excluding from its territory the representative of an 
external threat or aggression. That representative represents the 
otherness of the evil that comes to affect or infect the inside by 
unpredictably breaking into it. Yet the representative of the 
outside is nonetheless constituted, regularly granted its place by  
the community, chosen, kept, fed, etc., in the very heart of the 
inside. These parasites were as a matter of course domesticated  
by the living organism that housed them at its expense. „The  
Athenians regularly maintained a number of degraded and 
useless beings at the public expense; and when any calamity, 
such as plague, drought, or feminine, befell the city, they 
sacrificed two of these outcasts as scapegoats.‟ [emphasis in the 
original] (133) 
In being first rehumanised, Amy and R are thus offered ritualistically as the 
zombie pharmakoi or “scapegoats” for the symbolic purification of humanity 
in order to achieve ontological transcendence. The pharmakos, Derrida argues, 
is taken to be “the evil and the outside [where] the expulsion of the evil, its 
exclusion out of the body (and out) of the city [. . .] are the two major senses 
of the character and of the ritual” (130). In this sacrificial rite, the pharmakos 
is not only made the “scapegoat,” but also necessarily constructed as the 
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monstrous “evil” in opposition to the “good” humans. Sacrificial violence is 
thus the complete disavowal of the other half in a binaristically conceived 
relationship. When Gothic rehumanisation performs the pharmakos 
mythology, it symbolically purifies the human body and ontology, where all 
traces of animality are disavowed and expunged from within. In essence, 
human-animal and human-zombie relationships are similar as the zombie-
animal ultimately plays the role of the pharmakos in service of the human 
species.  
Indeed, there is no love for the sacrificial zombie-animal, and by love 
we mean care for the nonhuman other. In his final voiceover narration, R 
expresses a complete lack of remorse in killing the Boneys: “I wish I could say 
we cured the Boneys with love, but really, we just straight up killed them all. 
It sounds kind of messed up, but no one felt too bad about it. They were too 
far gone to change.” While the comedic tone of this statement attempts to 
downplay the violence of eradicating nonhuman otherness, it nonetheless very 
accurately reflects mankind‟s indifference—or care-lessness—towards such 
violence in reality. For even on a metatextual level, the zombie allegory 
performs the sacrificial ceremony of giving way to the narrative of Gothic 
rehumanisation. The discourse of species has been used and discarded, 
objectified as a subordinate literary device for serving humanist discourses 
such as resolving characters' interior and interpersonal conflicts, and bringing 
relationships to fruition. In this sense, these parasitic discourses of the human 
have also performed an epistemic “noncriminal putting to death” of the 
species discourse by sacrificing and therefore suppressing it. Whether on the 
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literal, symbolic, or epistemological level, the nonhuman species is eaten 
through and through by the insatiable human(ist) appetite.   
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3.  Ethics of “Eating Well” and Gothic Sacrifice of the Nonhuman 
Other 
Recent zombie narratives have caught on to the discourse of 
assimilationism in dealing with certain social others, reflecting the socio-
political shifts in the human rights movement of the Western scene. The 
traditionally monstrous zombie is now portrayed in a much more sympathetic 
light, where it is being rehumanised and reintegrated into the human 
community. Flesh begins with this premise, where the treated PDS sufferers 
return to their homes against a tense backdrop of xenophobia. Warm Bodies, 
on the other hand, ends with it: “The humans began to accept us, connect with 
us, teach us. This was the key to the cure.” The cure—indeed, zombieness is 
portrayed as a pathology that needs to be rectified. By association, this rhetoric 
pathologises the social otherness that zombieness is meant to be a metaphor 
for, which in turn reaffirms the normative centre as the “proper” site into 
which the previously monstrous social otherness is incorporated.  
But a more insidious problem with Gothic rehumanisation lies in its 
implicit support of the institution of speciesism in various ways. In both texts, 
three distinct camps can be discerned but it is always the “animalised animal” 
and the animalistic aspects of the liminal PDS sufferer or Corpse that are 
being suppressed in order to restore humanity. The rehumanised zombie, 
whose cannibalistic desire is suppressed in Flesh, is manipulated dietarily to 
deflect monstrosity to the animalistic rabid rotter. Gothic vegetarianism and 
carnivorism reinstall the nonhuman animal at the base of the food chain, 
keeping the literal and figurative sacrificial “lamb” as the default food on the 
100 
 
dining table. In turn, this secures the position of the human as the eater, and 
not a food-thing to be eaten, within the species order. 
Beyond the material level, institutionalised speciesism produces what 
Wolfe calls the “sacrificial symbolic econom[y]” (113) that allows humans to 
treat other fellow humans abusively using this logic of the animal. The 
obvious example is social oppression, where dehumanisation or animalisation 
tactics are used between two human subjects. The less obvious, though more 
cleverly disguised, is the seemingly opposite operation, that of social 
assimilationism, where the hitherto oppressed social other is being integrated 
into the dominant centre. Just like their oppressive counterparts, 
assimilationist regimes, though premised on the inclusion of certain human 
types, are found to actually perform the same exclusionary sacrifice of the 
nonhuman animal. In the context of a heteronormative environment, a 
heterosexual but cross-species relationship between a human and zombie is 
condemned, evoking taboo overtones of necrophilia and bestiality. Similarly, 
the regime of homonormativity that operates under the name of social 
inclusion is found to discriminate against the nonhuman zombieness of the gay 
zombie character. These regimes are thus revealed to be deeply speciesist as 
they stem from the long-standing anthropocentric tradition of excluding the 
nonhuman animal for the ontological transcendence of the human species. 
Gothic rehumanisation is thus as problematic as social assimilationism 
because both operations, whether explicitly or implicitly, follow the same 
speciesist logic of sacrificing the nonhuman other. Aesthetic representations 
mirroring problematic socio-political trends thus become an ethical concern 
that needs to be rigorously examined as well.  
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While assimilationist tactics bring about real social benefits to many 
individuals, they also leave other problems intact, or more precisely, 
repressed. Social hybridity emerging out of assimilationism may be a source 
of celebratory hope, but it is nonetheless a beacon of humanist hope purchased 
at the expense of the animal. It is a simultaneous but paradoxical celebration 
of the triumphant anthropocentrism and repressed speciesism of new human 
hybrid identities. One could even go so far as to say that all forms of 
anthropocentric assimilationism, old and new, are predicated on this sacrificial 
regime of speciesism if humanity continues to position itself against an 
oversimplified conception of the nonhuman animal.  
The animal is thus not only eaten for itself, sacrificed for our food 
industry, but also digested in our alimentary tract for the nourishment of our 
bodies and being, before it is being expelled to the periphery of the unwanted 
as waste. In the same vein, the species discourse is also milked of its 
usefulness for the nourishment of humanist discourses before it is being 
aesthetically discarded through Gothic rehumanisation. In Flesh, the species 
discourse recodes human otherness to serve as an “off-site” to reopen and 
resolve the coming-out narratives of queer sexualities, namely that of closeted 
homosexuality and cross-species heterosexuality. Kieren is thus able to 
express his homosexual identity through his metaphorical zombie skin, while 
Phillip espouses a questionable brand of liberal egalitarianism through his 
queer cross-species heterosexuality. Species otherness thus plays the 
subservient role of being a metaphorical surrogate for human sexual otherness 
within the textual hierarchy.  
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Towards the end, the PDS sufferer and Corpse are literally and 
literarily rehumanised, beginning with Amy and R. In retrenching the species 
discourse at the final point, the audience‟s “sadomasochistic” indulgence in 
the nonhuman aspects of these liminal beings may be delayed and disavowed 
as “animalistic” and thus “perverse” (Wolfe 118). This final gesture then 
operates as “what Lacoue-Labarthe calls a „theatricalisation‟” that allows the 
audience to “enjoy the [PDS] animality while seeming to contain it in the 
realm of the aesthetic” (qtd. in Wolfe 118). Like a wave of the wand, the 
magic show is over and the humanist order is restored. In fact, in the final 
episode of Being Human, Gothic rehumanisation takes on this specifically 
supernatural register as the vampire, werewolf, and ghost are magically turned 
back into human after breaking the curse of the devil. As Wolfe argues in his 
analysis of The Silence of the Lambs, the “genius of the domestication of 
Lecter, and hence, of the viewer‟s „enjoyment‟ generally, is that it cagily 
allows us to embrace and disavow [animality] all at once” (118). Indeed, the 
ambivalent tension in the middle portions of the narrative thus becomes a 
temporary source of motivation and enjoyment for the audience who is 
assured of a cathartic purging of nonhuman animality and a restoration of 
humanity at the end of the journey. 
It seems then that the Gothic genre is an essentially and necessarily 
speciesist platform for working out humanist anxieties over the human-
nonhuman divide, as well as for indulging the sadomasochistic pleasure of 
working these anxieties out from the safe distance of an aesthetic medium. 
Gothic rehumanisation adds another layer to this sense of self-delusion and 
illusion of humanist purity and immunity. This cycle repeats itself as the 
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Gothic genre relentlessly searches for its new horror target for constructing 
monstrosity. In an egalitarian human-human intersubjective set-up, 
monstrosity appears to disappear along the humanist plane, but it is actually 
being displaced on to the human-nonhuman divide of the species plane, such 
that the nonhuman animal is now posited as the repressed monster. The 
switching of discursive terrain to support the anthropocentric construction of 
liberal egalitarianism helps to conceal the exclusionary speciesist sacrifices 
involved. Zizek captures this mode of sacrificial repression succinctly:  
The subject “is” only insofar as the Thing (the Kantian Thing in 
itself as well as the Freudian impossible-incestuous object, das 
Ding) is sacrificed, “primordially repressed” . . . This 
“primordial repression” introduces a fundamental imbalance in 
the universe: the symbolically structured universe we live in is 
organised around a void, an impossibility (the inaccessibility of 
the Thing itself) [. . .] Therein [. . .] consists the ambiguity of 
the Enlightenment; the transcendence of the Enlightenment 
subject is shadowed by “a fundamental prohibition to probe too 
deeply into the obscure origins, which betrays a fear that by 
doing so, one might uncover something monstrous.” (qtd. in 
Wolfe 43) 
Indeed, the anthropocentric empire is built on carcasses, eaten, discarded, and 
buried out of sight and mind. If the history of mankind is a continual history of 
humanist atrocities of the myriad -isms, it is also because it has never had the 
clarity of what fundamentally enables them; that is, the institution of 
nonhuman speciesism, which, ironically repressed, by virtue of the material 
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and symbolic rituals of eating in human cultures, repeatedly enacts the 
Freudian haunting of the “return of the repressed” on human(ist) history.  
While the humanisation of the nonhuman monster undeniably serves 
an anthropocentric purpose, it is tempting to conclude that the final gesture of 
the full rehumanisation of the nonhuman other, a pushing of the mythological 
limit of the sympathetic monster to its absolute end by returning the creature 
to its Edenic origin, is a complete purification of all traces of animality 
contaminating the ontological category of the human. The “human” end 
product, the rehumanised monster, however, leaves a nagging, bitter aftertaste, 
for the ambivalent intermediary narratives of Warm Bodies and Flesh have 
already painstakingly proven to us that the category of the human is always 
already contaminated. Wolfe argues that  
what horror suggests for ideology critique, then, is that the 
ideological “point” of fictions may not lie exclusively with the 
reimposition of ideological norms in the fiction‟s ending, but 
rather may concern its complicated and contradictory middle, 
where identificatory energies are released and invested [. . .] 
energies aroused in the aesthetic experience of contradictory 
identifications are not fully recoupable by any ideological 
closure but rather continue, like, Lecter himself, to circulate in 
disguise on some other scene” (98-9) 
Gothic rehumanisation as a restoration of the lost purity of the 
ontological status of humanity is thus a pure illusion, for what it reveals is its 
very ambivalent, symbiotic relationship with animality, where the latter is in 
humanity, and humanity is very much in animality itself. As Petsche argues, 
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“there can be no human nature or subjectivity that stands above or apart from 
animality precisely because animality is much more complex than humans 
have allowed in the first place, and, furthermore, human beings are part of this 
complex „multiplicity‟” (103). Mitchell also argues for the plurality of the 
animal, stating that  
The reduction of the complex plurality of animals to a singular 
generality underwrites the poverty of humanism that thinks it 
has grounded itself in a human essence, a stable species identity 
to be secured by its contrast with animality. Heidegger‟s human 
hand versus the animal‟s claw, Freud‟s human eye versus the 
animal‟s nose, the Enlightenment‟s human rationality versus 
the animal‟s mechanical reflexes—all these tropes of difference 
are [. . .] understandable and inevitable efforts to define and 
affirm the species identity of human beings. But the claim to 
humanity and human rights will never succeed until it has 
reckoned with the irreducible plurality and otherness of 
nonhuman and posthuman life forms, including those that (like 
ourselves) wear a human face. (xii) 
Ultimately, the texts perform the carnivalesque function of drawing attention 
to the deconstructive journey of the narrative, rather than placing too much 
meaning on the ending in its restoration of the problematic status quo. In doing 
so, it reveals that the ending is more a naturalised, rather than a “natural” 
ending, and that even though Gothic rehumanisation remains essentially 
speciesist, these texts should not be dismissed completely for they have 
106 
 
diligently complicated the human-nonhuman divide mid-way to shatter the 
illusion of a wholesome closure.   
The question remains: how then does one “eat well?” It is not about 
whoever has the right to eat, because as Derrida argues in “Eating Well,” the 
maxim is that “[every]one must eat well” (115) and attention should be placed 
instead on how to eat well:  
The infinitely metonymical question on the subject of “one 
must eat well” must be nourishing not only for me, for a “self,” 
which, given its limits, would thus eat badly, it must be shared, 
as you might put it, and not only in language. “One must eat 
well” does not mean above all taking in and grasping in itself, 
but learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat. 
One never eats entirely on one‟s own: this constitutes the rule 
underlying the statement, “One must eat well.” It is a rule 
offering infinite hospitality. (“Eating Well” 115) 
In this sense, Gothic rehumanisation seems to constitute a form of “eating 
badly” because this aesthetic device nourishes only the humanist “self,” and 
gives nothing in return to the nonhuman other to “eat.” Gothic vegetarianism 
and the PDS sufferer‟s suppressed cannibalism are also examples of “eating 
badly” because these diets suppress the eater‟s natural desires, resulting in 
violent outbursts of repressed energies. A way that the Gothic genre can begin 
to “eat well” can be seen in the final season of True Blood where it explores 
the idea of a symbiotic relationship between the human and nonhuman other. 
Faced with a diseased breed of rabid vampires going on a bloodthirsty 
rampage, the human and healthy vampires of Bon Temps devise a buddy 
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system where each human is paired up with a vampire. In this relationship, the 
human has to feed the vampire a small dose of his or her blood enough for 
bare sustenance in return for protection from the Hep V vampires. While this 
begins as a promising premise, it quickly reveals itself to replicate the same 
speciesist structure as Warm Bodies and Flesh where a third animalistic 
party—here, the diseased, bloodthirsty vampires—is the readily available 
sacrifice. Nonetheless, the lack of a need to blindly follow the Gothic trend of 
rehumanising the nonhuman monster in this series—even having a cross-
species marriage scene in the final episode—signals a growing respect for the 
nonhuman otherness as it is, without altering or diminishing it. While the 
Gothic may be a space for enacting the old ways of recuperating humanity, it 
can also be a space that envisions and acknowledges the symbiotic co-
existence of human and nonhuman, such as in the case of True Blood, without 
have to erase each other. As Angela Carter says, “we live in Gothic times” 
(122); Gothic monsters are becoming so common and familiar to us we have 
to adopt new ethical strategies of co-existing with nonhuman otherness and 
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